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Lower  oil  prices  are  raising  doubts  about  the  underlying  assump-
tions  and ambitious  energy  programs  of the  last  decade. How-
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Energy  Dvovlopment
The developing world still needs large amounts  Mexico adopt to offset export losses?
of capital to meet its ever-expanding energy re-
quirements.  In most countries, these capital  How do developing countries decide
requirements are a big part of the total invest-  whether to invest in further oil and gas explora-
ment plan.  The problems of debt and public  tion or in altemative fuels, and how much should
revenues make the pursuit of efficiency as  the Bank support them?  What should be done
important a goal under declining fuel prices as it  with white elephant projects?
was under rising fuel prices.  Other issues are
less clear.  How  'o governments arrive at a productive
partnership between the public and private
In an era of uncertainty, how do oil-import-  sectors?
ing countries decide whether to pass savings
along to the consumer in lower oil prices or  What will happen in poorer developing
(considering the debt crisis) to treat them as  countries that cannot bear the high capital costs
windfall revenue gains? Reducing energy prices  of investing in fuel-switching capabilities yet
is relatively easy, but raising them has histori-  otherwise remain vulnerable to sudden fluctua-
cally presented problems.  What happens when  tions in fuel prices?
intemational prices go up again?
How do decisionmakers assess the risks of
What strategies should such non-OPEC oil-  energy investments in an uncertain energy
exporting countries as Malaysia, China, and  market?
This paper, a product of the Energy Development Division, Industry and Energy De-
partment, has also appeared as an Industry and Energy Department Working Paper.
Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC
20433.  Please contact Mary Femandez, IENED Publications Manager, room S4-
037, extension 33637.
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Plarming, and Research
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these fmdings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
Produced at the PPR Dissemination CenterFOREWORD
1986  and 1987  were years  of  considerable  confusion  for those  working
in the energy  field.  The lower  oil prices  called  into question  many of the
fundamental  assumptions  that  were the stock  in trade  of energy  experts  during
the previous  ten years.  In many developing  countries,  doubts  began  to arise
about  the  ambitious  energy  programs  and  projects  of the  past  decade.
The  collection  of papers in this volume represents  responses to
these  concerns,  prepared  by current  and former  World Bank staff.  They  do not
reflect  any "official"  position  of the Bank, but rather  are illustrative  of
the  impact  of the recent events on the thinking  of some of our staff who
continue  to be active  in the  still  ongoing  debate  over how  to interpret  energy
related  developments.
Although these papers  were initially  prepared  for quite different
audiences  and raise  a variety  of different  concerns,  a common  theme  that runs
throughout  the volume  is the  need to continve  the pursuit  of efficiency  goals
in the energy sector.  The developing  world still needs large amounts of
capital to  meet  its  ever-expanding  energy  requirements.  These capital
requirements  will be a  significant  part of most country's  total investment
plan.  Given  the  problems of  debt and  public revenues, the  pursuit of
efficiency  is just  as important  under  lower  fuel prices  as it is under  rising
fuel  prices.
These papers have been put together in one volume in order  to
facilitate access to some of  the interesting  and  provocative  ideas that
deserve  wider  circulation. Only  minor  editing  and selected  updating  have been
done.  As separate,  self-contained  presentations  made on different  occasions,
there is inevitably  some overlap,  but this also helps provide  continuity  and
consistency  to the  volume.
Anthony  A. Churchill
Director,  Industry  and
Energy  Department
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Introduction
In  developing  countries,  the  lower  crude  oil  prices  of  the  last  two
years have primarily  affected  government  budgets  and country  balance  of
paym ts flows. The  effect  of lower  oil  prices  has  been  mostly  limited  to
country  fiscal  impacts  for  at least  two  reasons. First,  there  has  not yet
been  enough  time for  many fundamental  growth-inducing  structural  changes  in
consumption  or investment  to  manifest  themselves.  Second,  and perhaps  more
important,  there  is a question  about  how  much  of the  decline  in oil  prices
developing  country  governments  initially  passed  through  to  final  consumers.
The  drop  that  took  place  in  international  crude  oil  prices  in  1986
attracted  worldwide  comment  and  reactions  ranging  from  relief  by  oil  consumers
to serious  concern  on the  part  of high-cost  oil  producers.  However,  the  oil
price changes  have not affected  most of  the fundamental  energy-related
problems  identified  in developing  countries  during the 1970s and early
1980s. The  demand  for  energy  investment  remains  large,  and  oil imports  (or
exports)  still  represent  a significant  outlay  (or  source)  of  foreign  exchange
for  most  developing  countries.  In  fact,  the  decline  in  oil  prices  and  accom-
panying  energy  price-related  uncertainties  have  created  their  own  new set  of
problems  for developing  countries. As a result,  energy  sector  investment
programs  must be reexamined.  Fiscal  regimes  and policies  need to be
refocused. Options  for increasing  the flexibiiity  of fuel switching  and
short-term  interfuel  substitution  must  be  addressed.  And,  of  course,  the  oil-
exporting  developing  countries  such  as  Mexico,  Nigeria,  Indonesia,  and  Egypt,
faced  with  reduced  foreign  exchange  earnings,  must  make  difficult  economic  and
financial  choices.
In addition  to short-term  policy  adjustments  to lower  oil  prices,
developing  countries  must also address  fundamental  longer term energy
issues.  These  include  massive  financing  requirements  for  energy  investments,
the diminished  interest  of commercial  banks in industrial  countries  in
financing  energy  investment  in high debt developing  countries,  inadequate
domestic  resource  mobilization,  fuelwood  shortages  and deforestation,  market
imperfections  in  the  production  and  allocation  of  energy  resources,  the
Note: The  initial  draft  of  this  paper  was  presented  at  the  conference  "Energy
1986:  Lessons  From  Turmoil"  organized  by  The  Royal  Institute  of
International  Affairs,  The  International  Association  of  Energy
Economists,  and  The  British  Institute  of  Energy  Economics  and  held  in
London  in  December,  1986.-2-
chronically  poor performance  of many energy  sector  enterprises,  and the role
of  the private sector in  financing and  operating energy production and
distribution  activities.
Backgroun.
In  considering che  effects of  lower  oil  prices  in  developing
countries,  it is important  to note that these countries  are a very hetero-
geneous  group. Therefore,  fluctuations  in  oil prices  will have  many different
impacts,  depending  on the  economic  characteristics  of the country--whether  it
is an oil importer  or oil exporter,  whether energy markets are allowed to
funccion  freely,  and depending  on the  strength  and composition  of its  economic
base, its natural resource endowment, income level, human resource skill
levels,  etc.
Although developing countries account for a  small share of the
world's  commercial  energy  consumption,  this share is increasing.  In fact,
most experts  agree that  commercial  energy  demand in developing  countries  has
tremendous growth  potential.  There  is,  however, great  uncertainty in
projecting  the rate at which that potential  will be realized.  During the
1970s, the  demand for commercial energy in developing countries grew an
average of 6X a  year, with oil consumption  increasing at about the same
rate.  As a result, developing  countries'  share in total commercial  energy
consumptiotn,  as well as in total  world oil consumption,  increased  from about
16Z  in 1973 to roughly  25Z  in 1985.  Developing  country  growth  in commercial
energy  consumption  slowed  during  the  1979-83  period  after  the second  oil  price
shock;  at that time,  the  rate of growth in  oil consumption  was less than that
for  total  commercial  energy. During  the last  couple  of years the  lower  growth
rates  have prevailed.
When world crude  oil prices  were incr:easing  during  the 1970s,  most
oil-  importing developing countries realized the  need  to raise domestic
petroleum  product  prices  to international  levels. This  was usually  palatable,
first  because  the  fiscal  impact  of subsidizing  oil consumption  was larger  than
most oil  importing governments could absorb, and  second, because it was
recognized  that subsidies  would increase  relative  con3umption  and result in
even  higher  financial  subsidies. By the  late 1970s  and  early 1980s,  most oil-
importing  developing  count-ies  had adjusted  to the  new,  higher  petroleum  price
levels,  although  in many  instances  tight  controls  on domestic  petroleum  prices
did not allow them to adjust quickly to short run fluctuations  in price.
There  were, however,  a few countries  that did  not adjust  prices  upward  during
this period--primarily  net oil exporters.  In the few developing  countries
that maintained low  petroleum prices during  the  1970s, demand  grew  at
relatively  higher rates and investment  decisions  tended  to favor relatively
energy-intensive  activities  and consumption  patterns.
While many factors  may be responsible  for the different rates of
economic  growth  in individual  developing  countries  during  the 1970s  and early
1980s,  the evidence  on one point is fairly  clear.  Countries  that fostered
more market- oriented economies and  increased petroleum prices to reflect
-international  levels  generally  experienced relatively  stronger  economic-3-
growth. On the  other  hand,  oil importing  countries  in  which  the public  sector
dominated  the economy  and the government  shielded  consumers  from balanc- of
payments  difficulties  tended  to experience  relatively  less bouy^nt economic
activit>.
Country  Fiscal  Impact
As noted  above, the  :line  in crude oil price-  that took place in
early 1986 has primarily  affec 'd  government  budgets and country balance of
payments  flows.  As a result  or the  almost  halving  of  il prices,  from about
US$30/barrel  to  US$15/barrel,  the  world  economy  is experiencing  the  equivalent
of a relative  transfer  of revenues  from  oil exporters  to oil importers.  In
this  process,  there  are winners  and  there  are losers.
To  many oil-importing  developing coun.ries, the decline in oil
prices  is providing  needed fiscal  relief.  For example,  a drop in prices to
US$15/barrel  could  reduce  the import  bill in Korea  by about  2.5% of GDP and in
the Philippines  and Thailand by just under 2%.  Turkey, Thailand, Korea,
Brazil,  and India,  as principal  beneficiaries  of an oil  price  fall,  could save
from 10  to 20Z  of their total  annual  import  bills.
On the  other  hand,  developing  country  members  of  OPEC, many  of which
rely on  oil exports  to provide  anywhere  between  50-90%  of their  revenues,  have
been adversely  affected  by lower  oil prices,  as well as by the recent  fall in
the value of the US dollar.  Non-OPEC  developing  country  exporters,  such as
Malaysia, China, and Mexico, also are experiencing  serious export revenue
losses. For example,  if oil  were selling  at US$15/barrel,  Malaysia  and  China
could  lose about  US$1.6  billion  and US$2.5  billion  respectively,  each  year in
revenues. In GNP  terms,  this  loss  would  amount  to about  5% of GNP in  Malaysia
and less  than  0.5%  for China. However,  for  China,  a price  of US$15/barrel  for
oil could bring about a 10% loss in total export earnings.  In Malaysia,  a
price of US$15/barrel  for oil could imply  a loss of about  20% in government
revenue.
Of course,  the decline  in oil prices  also conveys  secondary  effects
which could benefit  many developing  countries.  These effects,  other things
being equal, include reduced inflation  and interest  rates, and hence lower
expenses  for  debt  service.
Domestic  Oil  Pricing  Policies
In the relatively small number of developing  countries that have
less regulated  energy  markets,  the fall in world oil prices  has been mostly
passed on  to final consumers.  In some instances, this has  resulted in
selective fuel switching and other small increases in the demand for oil
products.  However,  in the many developing  countries  where fuel prices and
supplies  are heavily regulated, or where there are other upstream market
imperfections,  the  lower  international  oil prices  have not  completely  filtered
through to  many of  the  downstream markets.  For  example, while  the- 4 -
Philippines  and  Malaysian  governments  have passed  on part  of the  price  declin
to  consumers, many  other  developing country governments initially kep
petroleum  prices  constant  or even tried  to increase  them (e.g.,  India). Ther
are se%aral  reasons  for not immediately  passing  through  savings  in oil  price
to final  consumers.
o  Governments  may want to take  advantage  of the reduced  price to
capture  additional  government  revenues;
o  Governments  may take a cautionary  stance of not passing too
much of the savings  forward,  against  the likelihood  that  worLd
oil prices  will remain  volatile  and the  possibility  that  prices
might rebound  significantly;
°  There  may be an adjustment  lag  in  the  many developing  countries
which have regulated  responses to external  market change, so
prices  do not  adjust  automatically;  and,
o  Any potential  adjustments  to be made must also reflect  shifts
in currency  values.
The basic point is that sudden windfall revenue  gains can give a
country time for maneuvering.  Energy policymakers in many oil-importing
developing  countries  are still  considering  how the  surplus  revenues  resulting
from the lower  oil import  prices  should  be allocated  between  the government,
consumers,  and  energy  companies. To what degree  should  domestic  retail  prices
follow the world market?  Should prices be maintained at higher levels,
allowing  government  to capture the margins for fiscal reasons?  Should  the
incentives  designed to encourage oil and gas exploration  by international
companies  be maintained,  improved  or reduced?  Should  oil importers  defer or
revise  some planned  domestic  energy investments? What should  be the short-
term  strategy  for improving  energy  conservation  and  efficiency?
A strict  application  of economic  efficiency  criteria  would suggest
that petroleum  fuel prices  be adjusted  to reflect  international  market levels
(border prices).  Among other things, this would help export industries  to
remain  competitive. On the other hand, there  are a number of oil-importing
developing  countries  where, because of large public sectors or balance of
payment  deficits,  government  fiscal issues  tend to dominate.  It is in these
countries  that the options for capturing rents and related issues  must be
given particular  attention.  Governments  must carefully  analyze  methods for
capturing  the windfall  oil revenues  and attempt to choose  the mix of energy
taxation schemes that best accommodates the  principles  of efficiency and
neutrality.
Apart from economic  efficiency  and fiscal  criteria,  policymakers  of
course also consider the political dimension of adjusting prices.  While
reducing energy prices in many developing countries is a  relatively easy
process,  historically  there  have  been political  and  social  problems  associatedwith increasing  energy  prices.  Finally,  governments  must also guard  against
the  risk  that  energy  efficiency  and  conservation  programs  may  be  deemphasized
and  that  the  prevailing  reduced  level  of  oil  prices  may  detract  attention  from
the  longer  term  need  for  efficiency  in  use.
Longer  Term  Investment  Impact
If  changes  in  oil  prices  eventually  are  passed  through  to  downstream
markets,  the energy  consumption  level and the mix of investment  in all
commercial  and many non-commercial  energy  sources  will be affected. On3
consequence  of  lower  oil  prices  and  the  greater  uncertainty  and  volatility  in
the  international  oil  markets is  that  larger  energy  consumers  will  consider
investing  in more flexible  plant  and equipment  to increase  fuel  switching
capability.  This  has  already  happened  in  many  industriatized  countries,  and
the  same process  of fuel  diversification  and investment  in fuel switching
capacity  is  now  expected  to speed  up in  some  of the  middle-income  developing
countries.
Many  of the  poorer  developing  countries,  however,  cannot  bear  the
higher  capital  cost  of  investments  required  to  promote  greater  fuel.  flexibil-
ity. Therefore,  they  will  be relatively  more  vulnerable  to  sudden  fluctua-
tions  in  future  fuel  prices.
In  the  petroleum  sector,  lower  oil  prices  are  forcing  international
oil  companies  (IOCs)  and  national  oil companies  (NOCs)  to  be more  selective
and to restrict  discretionary  outlays  for oil and gas exploration  and
development.  This  even  applies  to  developing  countries  that  have  relatively
good  prospects.  In  some  cases,  IOCs  find  that  an  investment  in  the  production
of hydrocarbon  resources,  while economically  attractive  for the developing
country,  is  of  low  financial  priority  for  the  IOC.
If developing  countries  that have exploration  potential  wish to
avoid  a continued  reduction  in  their  exploration  programs,  many  of  them  will
have  to adjust  to the  new situation  by:  (a)  making  more  attractive  areas
available  to IOCs;  (b)  negotiating  more flexible  exploration  contracts  that
provide  better  returns  to  the  IOCs  during  periods  of  low  prices,  but  perhaps
allow  the  country  to  recapture  a  larger  share  if  prices  rise;  and  (c)  allowing
IOCs  to stretch  out their  work  commitments  and adopt  a policy  of stepwise
decision  making.  Relatively  high cost oil-producing  countries  might also
consider  postponing  exploration  and development  for  new oil fields  on the
grounds  that  volatile  oil  prices  could,  during  the  next  few  years,  decrease  as
well as increase.  The overall  objective  of developing  countries  in the
petroleum  sector  should  be to obtain  the maximum  present  value  of total
revenues,  not  the  maximum  current  royalty  per  unit  of  oil  or  gas.
Natural  gas  investments  most  likely  to  be  affected  by  lower  fuel  oil
prices  are  those  which  involve  long  distance  pipelines  and liquified  natural
gas,  i.e,  those  projects  which  have  high  up-front  fixed  costs. In  countries
which  have  low  cost  gas  supplies  and  relatively  short  distances  from  the  gas
field  to  the  market,  natural  gas  development  for  domestic  use  should,  in  mostinstances,  remain  economically  attractive. A1so,  where gas pipeline  n-  iorks
have already been constructed,  as in Banglndesh,  Pakistan,  Yugoslavia,  and
Argentina, the  incremental  cost of additicnal gas  production  will likely
continue  to be equal to or lower than fuel oil costs.  Where gas resources
have been discovered  but not developed,  as in Tanzania  and Papua  New Guinea,
the choice between  gas and fuel oil is likely  to be more difficult  and will
depend,  to a large  extent,  on the potential  size  of the  domestic  market  and on
the relative  cost of alternative  fuels.  Of coi'rse,  as with other capital-
intensive  energy projects  of long d'zration,  adequate  long-term  financing  and
guaranteed early full capacity utilization  will  be essential elements in
obtaining  an acceptable  cash flow  during  the  early  years  of operation.
The  power  sector consumes the  largest share of  public sector
investment in  many  developing countries, and  the  current energy  price
uncertainties  have made planning issues in this sector mc-- complex.  New
investment  plans  need to be analyzed  for their  robustness  ovr  wide range  of
cenarios and  with a  more critical eye  to flexibility  primary energy
sources. Many developing  countries  need to introduce  new  methods  for  reducing
gisk in  their  investment  decision-making  processes. In fact,  the domestic  and
foreign  exchange  resource  constraints  and debt service  obligations  that many
developing  countriLes  face, together  with uncertain  fuel prices  and exchange
rates,  tends  in  many instances  to favor  investment  options  that  are less lumpy
and  that are  flexible and  involve shorter construction  periods and  lower
capital  costs.  For example,  new power  plants  constructed  to use imported  or
domestic  fuels  in  some  instances might  be  equipped  for  dual  firing
(coal/oil/gas)  with  only a modest  increase  in capital  costs.  This  would allow
the plant  to take advantage  of future  shifts  in relative  fuel prices.  Also,
when considering  alternative  energy sources,  at the margin  a series  of small
thermal  plants  (as  compared,  for  example,  with one large  hydro  project)  could
provide increased flexibility in  adapting to  changing supply  costs  and
uncertain  demand  conditions.
The renewable  or household  energy sector in most developing  coun-
tries should not be greatly affected  by lower oil prices.  Some additional
substitution  may take place in urban households  switching  from woodfuels or
charcoal to kerosene.  However, in general, the lower price of oil alone
should  not cause  major  short-term  changes  in the  consumption  of wood products,
animal  wastes,  or other residue  energy  sources.  Wind and solar  applications
so far  have  not provided  large  amounts  of energy  in developing  countries,  and
pending a  major  technical breakthrough this situation probably will  not
change.
Over  the longer term, of course, the penetration  of commercial
energy into  the  household  'ctor is  likely to  increase.  However,  the
budgetary  and balance  of paym,'.cs  burden  of accelerating  this  penetration  over
the  short-term is  probably  too  high  for  most  developing countries  to
sustain. The primary  issue  to determine  through  time  will be the  best way to
provide  and price  LPG, kerosene,  and other conventional  energy forms  to meet
growing urban household energy  needs at least cost, and in ways helpful to
those  most in need.- 7  -
Organization  and Financing  Issues
Although  oil-related  investments  have fallen in some oil producing
developing  countries  due to lower  oil prices,  the  long-term  demand  for  overall
energy-related  investments in all developing countries will likely remain
high.  Satisfying this demand will  require large amounts of  financial
resources,  often during  periods of extreme resource  scarcity.  For example,
the amount  of new energy investment  required  to support  a 4% growth rate in
commercial  energy  demand in developing  countries  has been estimated  to be a4
high  as US$80  billion/year. Of this  amount,  roughly  70%  could  be for  electric
power  and  thxe  balance  for  coal,  oil, and  gas.
To minimize the amount of new energy investment  required and to
attract new  capital to  the  sector, developing countries must place more
emphasis  on innovative  financing schemes,  efficiency  pricing, institutional
and organizational  strengthening,  investwent  for interfuel  substitution  which
acknowledges  uncertainty, and  the  development of  indigenous oil and  gas
resources  where economically  justified.  These factors  are interrelated. By
creating  an environment  which can attract energy investment funds from a
variety of  sources, countries must  provide incentives for  an  efficient
allocation of  energy  resources and  for  efficient management of  energy
enterprises,  and  vice versa.
A number of innovative  financial  options  have been suggested  that
might assist in maintaining  energy investment  programs  while minimizing  the
accrual  of  new  debt.  These  options  include  some of the  following:
o  more IOC  farm-ins  or other joint  venture  arrangements  with
NOCs;
o  financial leasing arrangements  involving dummy  offshore
companies,  commercial  banks,  and  suppliers;
o  operational  leasing  arrangements  in which the lessor  also
operates  and  maintains  the  installations;
o  enclave  financing  arrangements  for  power  generation  in  which
the  owner-operator  sells  power  to  a  public  grid  or  wheels  it  to
specific  consumers;
o  the sale  of electricity  futures  to consumers  that  desire  longer
term  price  contracts;
o  conversion  of some  portion  of  country  energy  debt  into  leasing
arrangements;
conversion  of some  portion  of country  energy  debt  into  equity
with  a possible  put option  to reconvert  the  equity  into  debt
after a given  period;- 8 -
o  other  debt-equity  swaps  and related  operating  arrangements;  and
o  direct,  private  equity  financing.
Of course, the legislative,  regulatory,  and ccntractual  implications  of the
above, and  related profit repatriation issues, would have  to be  thought
through  in detail.
Pz:tly to assist in to attracting financing,  a  climate of more
efficient  resource  use  might  be  promoted  through  some  fundamental
rest.ucturing  in which market forces are introduced and greater scope is
allcved for  private sector involvement,  both domestic ar.d  international.
Clearly,  it will be difficult  to increase  the amount  of resources  going into
the energy sector  in developing  countries  as long as existing  resources  are
used  so inefficiently.  In  an era of fiscal  constraints,  neither  the  government
nor  the  public is  likely to  continue to  toleratce  the  high  costs  and
inefficiencies  of  many public  power,  oil and  gas  monopolies. Power  utilities,
for example,  cannot  continue  to im'ke  up for inefficient  and costly  practices
and  occasional  white  elephant  investments  by raising  tariffs,  without  creating
greater consumer and  investor resistance.  And, now that the cushion of
profits  associated  with the previous  era of high oil prices  has been  reduced,
many national  oil, gas, and coal enterprises  also will  need to consider  ways
to restructure  themselves  and to improve  their  operating  efficiency.
The primary issue is not so much what needs to be done but how to do
it.  There  are  no  magic  answers, as  each case  tends  to  be a  little
different.  However,  underlying  the special  circumstances  of each situation,
there  is  one key factor  that  must be considered  in improving  the  efficiency  of
energy  sector  investment  and management: the  role of government.
The Role  of Government
Many  problems  relating  to  management  accountability  and
inefficiencies in  enetgy  prodaction, distribution, and  consumption  in
developing  countries  can be attributed  to inappropriate  choices in the roles
to be played by the public and private sectors.  All too often the public
sector  has tried  to undertake  more than it can handle  given its  limited  human
and financial resources.  This has sometimes led to a relative  neglect of
those things that can only be done by the public sector.  By focusing  on
operating  company investment  plans,  administration,  production,  distribution,
retailing,  billing, etc., for example, government  can overlook fundamental
policy  issues and strategic  directions  relating  to energy sector  structure,
regulation,  pricing, and  related environmental issues.  Many developing
countries  need to reexamine  the role of government  in the energy  sector,  not
to eliminate  governzent's  role but to define a more productive  partnership
between  it and the public  and private  operating  companies.  The  merits  of the
various  sector  organizational  structures  of course  have to be weighed in each
individual  case.-9-
Looking  Ahead
Although  the  energy  problems facing  developing countries are
numerous, they are  not  intractable.  Developing country governments are
beginning to adjust to  the new era of uncertainties  by addressing sector
inefficiencies  and reviewing  energy legislation,  fiscal  regimes,  and sector
institutions. The roles of government  and of market forces  are increasingly
being  debated,  and some of the white elephant  projects  of the past are being
discarded.  Investment  options  are being reconsidered. There is certainly  a
basis  for  optimism.- 10  -
Energy  Efficiency  in Developing  Countries
Ian Hume
Overview
The economic  disruption  caused by the two oil shocks  of the 1970s
gave developing  countries  a compelling  incentive  to  -mprove  the  management  of
their  energy supplies.  Besides  expediting  investments  to develop  indigenous
energy sources,  many developing  countries turned their attention to energy
conservation  and efficiency improvements  as alternatives  to importing  oil.
Since the oil price increases  made petroleum  and other energy  sources  appear
to be more expensive--and  highly intensive in foreign exchange--developing
country  policymakers  began  to look for ways to conserve  energy. Now that  the
pressures  on oil prices  have abated somewhat,  one must consider  whether  this
emphasis on  energy efficiency is  still warranted in developing  countries
today,  and, if so, what priority  it should be given relative to the ocher
objectives  of energy  sector  management.
Overall, lower oil prices should not reduce the need for energy
efficiency  or the priority  of conservation  and energy  efficiency  programs  in
relation to other management objectives.  There are  several reasons for
this.  First,  oil has proven  to be a volatile  energy  source;  it may be cheap
today,  but it probably  will not remaia so indefinitely. Furthermore,  even
though the cost of oil has declined, the cost of other energy sources  has
not.  Consider,  for example,  those  energy  sources  which  are driven  by the  cost
of new  dam  construction,  or coal  mines.  Second,  regardless  of the  world  price
of oil, energy economy and conservation  efforts are needed to preserve  or
strengthen  the competitiveness  of transport  and industry--particularly  in the
cement, petrochemicals,  and metallu4rgy  industries,  which are heavy users of
energy.  Third, and most importantly,  energy  savings  actually  can provide  an
alternative  form  of energy  supply,  in that it is much  cheaper  to supply  energy
by releasing portions  from existing supply  capacity than it is to add new
capacity. Energy  efficiency  therefore  is important  as a means of economizing
on investment  capital.  This last point cannot be overemphasized  because
almost all developing  countries  suffer from critical  shortages  of investment
capital.  In the power  sector  alone,  capital  can account  for  half the  cost of
every  kilowatt-hour  produced;  clearly  the potential  for saving  capital  here
by saving  kilowatts  is  very large. On a global  scale,  power  system  expansions
in the  developing  world  require  about  $55  billion  a year in investment  capital
(1982  constant  US$).  Energy  efficiency  and  conservation  efforts  could  release
much  of this  precious  capital  for  other  priority  public  uses.
Note:  The  initial  draft  of this  paper  was delivered  to an energy  workshop
organized  by the  Tata Energy  Research  Institute  in Jaipur,  India,  in
December  1986.- 11  -
Concepts  in Energy  Efficiency
Before  proceeding,  it is important  to define  what we mean by energy
efficiency  and to make a distinction  between ic and the concepts  of energy
intensity,  energy savings, and energy rationalization. Energy intensity is
the  consumption  of energy  per unit of product  output,  or GDP.  Energy  savings
represent  a reduction in this intensity.  Energy rationalization  is a com-
bination  of energy  savings  and switching  from  higher  cost to Lower  cost fuels.
I
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Energy efficiency is  the  generic term  which,  to  some degree,
embodies  all of these concepts.  At its center there is a purely  technical
concept relating to  process coefficients of  energy  transformation.  Our
concern  here, however, is with the broader issues surrounding  the economic
efficiency  of energy  supply  and use.  In the  process  of producing,  delivering,
and  consuming  energy  there is a continuum  of activities--investment  in energy
supply  capacity;  production  and transformation;  transmission  and  distribution
processes;  and final use.  The efficiency  concept  should  be applied  to all of
these  activities.
Energy supply may be  said to be efficient when the structure of
energy  investments  gives a cost-optimal  mix of energy sources.  This mix is
achieved  when energy is produced and delivered at minimum cost for given
levels  of reliability. Energy  end use is considered  efficient  when  energy is
consumed at  minimum  unit  rates  for  given  quantities and  standards of
consumption  output.  The  implementation  of both efficiency  concepts leaves
ample  room for improvement  in  developing  countries.- 12 -
Developing  Country  Trends
The available  country  and global  data suggest  there  are at least
four  broad  opportunities  for  developing  countries  to  strengthen  energy
efficiency:  (a)  by  reducing  their  energy  intensity  levels;  (b)  by  decoupling
energy  demand  from  economic  growth;  (c) by adopting  supply  policies  which
strengthen  investments,  operational  practices,  and pricing  decisions;  and
(d)  by  making  the  largest  industrial  consumers  more  efficient  users  of  energy
through  housekeeping  and  retrofitting  improvements.
Energy  Intensity
Although  energy  intensities  worldwide  have  fallen  sharply  since  the
1970s,  energy  intensities  in developing  countries  as a whole actually  have
t-en  increasing.  Most,  if  not  all,  of the  declines  in  energy  intensity  have
sken place in  the developed  countries. Two processes  account  for this
difference.  One  is a "development  process"  which  embodies  growth  and  income
effects  elicited  by structural  changes  in production  and consumption.  The
other  is  an "efficiency  process"  which  refle-ts  the  cost  and  pricing  effect's
of improvements  in  the  behavior  of  energy  use  coefficients.
ENERGY  INTENSITY  IN  OEVELOPED ANO DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
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In  the developed  countries,  the  downward  trend  in  intensities  is
consistent  with  a  strong  efficiency  process,  reinforced  by  a  development
process  which  brings  about  a decline  in  energy-intensive  smokestack  industries
and the  growth  of service  industries.  At the  same  time,  the  industrialized
countries  have responded  to  past oil  shortages  with  deliberate  energy
conservation  and  rationalizacion  policies.- 13  -
ENERGY  INTENSITY  TRENDS  IN  GS  COUNTRIES
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In developing  countries,  there is evidence  that the efficiency
process  may  have  reduced  energy  intensities  for  certain  activities.  However,
structural  elements  in  the  development  process  largely  offset  these  efficiency
improvements. Industrialization  in developing  countries  brings  with it
urbanization,  growth  of smokestack  industries,  electrification,  moderniza-
tion--all  of  which  serve  to  raise  energy  intensities.  Furthermore,  developing
countries  appear  to have been slower  to implement  efficiency  measures,  as
energy  intensities  there  did  not show  any  appreciable  decline  until  1981/82.
In industrialized  countries,  or.  the other hand, a  reduction  in energy
intensity  could be observed  very soon after the first  oil shock.  This
suggests  that  developed  countries  may have been  able to decouple  economic
growth  from  energy  demand  much  more  rapidly  than  developing  countries.
DecouDling  Energy  Demand  and  Economic  Growth
Developed  countries  may have been  able to separate  energy  demand
from  economic  growth  faster  because  they  instigated  efficiency  measures  at a
time  when  absolute  levels  of  energy  consumption  were  relatively  high  for  their
stage  of industrialization,  and the pattern  of economic  growth  favored  less
energy-intensive  industries.  The result  was continued  economic  growth,
largely  from service  industries,  and reduced  energy  consumption  overall.
Japan  is  a  striking  example  of  this  pattern.- 14  -
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1/  Country  Groups:
Group  A  - Ecuador,  Syria, Greece,  India, Turkey,
Argentina,  Mexico,  Zaire, Portugal
Group  B  - Thailand,  Morocco,  Colombia,  South  Africa,
Brazil,  Pakistan,  Korea, Cameroon,  Indonesia
Group  C  - Philippines,  Malaysia,  Tanzania,  Israel,
Kenya,  Zimbabwe
Developing  countries  probably  will  noC  experience  such  dramatic
decoupling  because  different  structural  processes  are  at  play.  For  one,
income elasticities  of demand  for energy  are higher,  implying that consumers
will  tend  to  use  more  energy  as  incomes  rise  in  accordance  with  economic
growth.  For another thing, price elasticities of demand for energy are lower
than  in  developed  countries,  implying  that  consumers  are  less  inclined  to
curtail consumption  in response co increases in energy prices.  Some progress
can  be made  to  separate energy  demand  from economic growth  by reducing  the
income elasticity of  demand to unity.  However, this process is bound to be a
slow  one,  necessarily  limited  by  the  pace  of economic  development  in  each
country.  More  immediate  improvements  in energy  efficiency  can  be  invoked
through the use of conscientious supply-side policies.
Efficiency in Practice:  Energy Supply
The concept of efficiency  in energy supply covers all the processes
embodied  in  energy  sector  management:  investment,  production/generation,
transmission, distribution, and final supply for each of the energy sources--
power, coal, petroleum, gas, and oiofuels.  The overriding objective of energy
supply  decisions  should  be  to  secure  high  quality  supplies  at  the  lowest
possible  investment  and  operating  cost  to  the economy,  and  to  price  these
supplies  to  consumers  at  a  level  which  reflects  their  long  run  marginal
costs.  Developing  countries  clearly  need  to  strengthen  efficiency  in  alL
three areas:  investment planning, operational procedures, and pricing.- 15  -
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Examples  of investment  inefficiencies  are not hard to find.  In the
power  sector,  which  absorbs  up  to  two-thirds of  energy  investments,
inefficiencies  often  can  be  observed  in  the  form  of  excess  generating
capacity.  For example,  seven East African  countries  currently  exhibit  about
3,000 megawatts of excess power generating  capacity  over and above reserve
margins.  At $2,000 per kilowatt this represents  a  needless cost of some
$6 billion  in investment  capital  which  could be applied  productively  in other
sectors.  Latin  America shows similar  patterns  of inefficiency. In  CoLombia,
energy investments  (mostly for power) made up about 50% of public sector
investments  in 1985, even though there already was 50% surplus generating
capacity in  the syscem.  Few developing countries can afford  such large
margins  of premature  capital  use.
The power sector also is home to many operational  inefficiencies,
particularly  in the transmission  and distribution  functions,  where losses  can
be as high as 352 of the total  power generated. These inefficiencies  incLude
both technical  losses  and unmetered  consumption,  which are expected  to cause
some losses  but of a  much smaller  magnitude--perhaps  4-8Z.  The  World Bank  has
estimated  that  countries  showing  average  technical  losses  of 20% overall  could
save the  capital investment  on one full  year's  demand  growth  just by reducing
these losses  to 142.  This is another  example  where  energy  efficiency  can be
employed  to save valuable  investmenc  capital.
Operational  inefficiencies also  can  be  observed  in  the  poor
management of  spare  parts  inventories.  For  wanc  of  reLativeLy minor
expenditures  in the provision  of spare parts,  some developing  countries  (such
as Turkey and India)  suffer disproportionate  coscs in power  outages.  While- 16 -
outages  can serve  to ration  supplies  where there  is  an undersupply  of electric
power,  the disruptions  they impose  are enormously  costly  in related  economic
activity  and they  do not  discriminate  between  efficient  and inefficient  power
users.  Furthermore,  power outages can occur even where there is excess
generating  capacity,  particularly  if the foreign  exchange  needed  to purchase
spare  parts is  not available.
In the oil and gas sectors,  inefficiencies  can take several  forms.
Here artificial  contractual  and pricing terms  set by government  agencies  for
private  operators  can create  false  operating  economies. These  in turn  lead  to
suboptimal  investments  which  prolong  the  need for  costly  energy  imports. Many
countries  have  refineries  (some  of them  government  operated)  that  generate  net
economic losses and  should be rationalized,  privatized,  or closed.  For
example, in Yugoslavia refinery losses are about 1.7% of crude oil input,
compared  to 0.5-1.0%  worldwide,  and the refinery's  own consumption  of energy
averages  about 7%, compared  to a world average  of 3-4%.  In most developing
countries,  private  sector  participation  in  energy  operations  could
s;gnificantly  improve  operating  efficiencies,  as well as provide  technology,
know-how,  and equity  financing. Although  private  operators  cannot  be allowed
to  dominate  the  energy supply  arena,  they nevertheless  have an important  role
to  play in the  sector  which  should  be encouraged  in  developing  countries.
In  the  household energy  sector, inefficiencies occur  in  the
processes of  converting,  utilizing, and valuing various forms of biomass
cooking  and heating  fuels. Household  energy  is the single  largest  provider  of
energy in developing countries--often  accounting for 60-80% of all energy
consumed  in  a country. Although  the  markets  for  household  fuels  typically  are
informal  or nonexistent,  they still  allow for  sharp  discrepancies  between  the
private  and social  costs  of using  these  fuels.  For example,  because  fuelwood
usually is burned at very low heating efficiencies  (10-15%),  it often is
regarded  as a free good  or else priced  at much less than  its  full  cost.  This
suboptimal  pricing encourages  excessive felling  of trees for fuel which can
lay bare entire forests, destroy soil fertility,  and jeopardize the very
productive  base  of a country's  food  supply.
Inefficient  pricing can spawn problems  in other sectors as well,
either  because  resources  are priced  below cost or because  they  are priced  at
full  cost before  the  economic  climate  can support  it.  Either  policy  can  cause
distortions  in consumption  patterns  and lead to poor investment  decisions  or
an unbalanced  mix  of energy fuels.  One example of below-cost  pricing is
Brazil's alcohol program, which imposes a  massive subsidy burden on  the
national budget.  Another example is  the low  level of power tariffs in
countries  like  Egypt and China,  which have not adjusted  tariffs  in more than
three decades.  Obviously these prices do not send appropriate  signals to
consumers,  and the countries  undoubtedly  exhibit  higher  energy  intensities  as
a result.
It is  evident  there  is  much that  developing  countries  can  do to save
energy  by taking  a critical  look  at their investments,  operational  practices,
and pricing  policies  for energy  supply.  It is equally  important  for them  to
look  at the  area of end  use  efficiency  as a means  of saving  energy.- 17  -
End  Use  Efficiency  and  Conservation
one  of  the  most  expedient  methods  of improving  end  use  efficiencies
in  developing  counteies  is to encourAge  the largest  consumers  of energy  to
employ  better  housekeeping  measures  and make longer  term  retrofitting  and
process  modifications  to  their  industrial  plants.
AVERAGE ENERGY PRICE  AND  INCOME ELASTICITILES
OF  DEMAND  FOR  MAJOR  ECONOMIC  REGIONS
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Luckily  for  policymakers,  just  a  handful  of  industrial  consumers  are
responsible  for  consuming  a Large  share  of  the  total  energy  used  in  developing
countries. Of the  250  or so major  industrial  enterprises  operating  there,
only  12  account  for  about  702  of  the  energy  used.  1/ This  means  that  policy
actions  can be targeted  on a very  narrow  band of industries,  with  a large
payoff  potential.
World  Bank  staff  estimate  that  short-term  housekeeping  improvements
could  save  as  much  as  35-66  million  tons  of  oil  equivalent  (MTOE)  per  year  in
1/  The twelve  leading  energy  consumers  are:  petroleum  fuels,  petrochemicals,
steeL,  aluminum,  fertilizers,  cement,  gLass,  bricks  and  ceramics,  pulp  and
paper,  sugar,  and  finished  textiles.- 18  -
developing  countries.  An additional  59-ll  MTOE potentially  could be saved
from retrofitting  and process  modifications.  The largest savings possibil-
ities are  in  the steel, petroleum refining, cement, pulp and  paper, and
chemical  industries.
Every effort  should  be made to pursue  these  efficiency  improvements
vigorously  in developing  countries.  The savings potential is quite large;
payback periods are  short where  investments  are  needed;  and  the  cost
reductions  resulting  from energy  savings  should  help to boost  competition  in
the  affected  industries.
Implementing  Efficiency  Improvements
By now it should be evident  that there  are many causes of energy
inefficiency in developing countries.  The  very  task  of  producing and
delivering secure energy supplies  at the scale demanded in these growing
economies  is an enormous  one  which places  heavy  demands  on available  capital,
management  and skilled  manpower  resources,  and the political  will of govern-
ments.  Furthermore,  institutions  in the sector  may not always  be strong  or
efficient,  decisions  regarding  large investments  with subsector  linkages  may
not be well coordinated,  and competition  for scarce  capital  among political
and institutional  lobbies may constrain  supply  decisions  and interfere  with
rational  pricin3. To begin to overcome  some of these  obstacles,  policymakers
should  follow  a few  basic  principles.
First, efforts should be  made  to  foster an  open,  competitive
economy,  as this is the best way to ensure  overall economic  efficiency  and
efficiency  in energy  supply  and  use.
Second,  energy  resources  should  be priced  high enough  to cover  their
long run  marginal  costs.  This policy  will help policymakers  to manage  demand
effectively  and provide  the supplying  entities  with the cash flow needed to
finance  their  maintenance  and  expansion  plans.
Third, investment  processes  and decision  criteria  need to be based
on sound,  objective  data.  In  the power  sector,  investments  should  be based  on
substantive  least-cost development programs which  can  be  used  to resist
pressure  from political  lobbies  and other groups.  Clear  decision  making is
particularly  crucial  at a time when unstable  oil prices  heighten  the uncer-
tainty  of  many investment  choices. Least  cost programs  for  that reasoni  should
be risk-adjusted,  favoring  smaller,  more flexible  increments  to power systems
in  order  to avoid  costly  mistakes.
Fourth, in managing the  sector, government should promote the
efficiency  of enterprises  by clarifying  the respective  roles of government
departments, public  utilities, and  private  operators.  In  this  task,
government  should  confine itself  to structuring  a regulatory  framework  which
provides  maximum  autonomy  and  accountability  to these  entities  and encourages
greater  private  sector  participation  in  energy  supply.- 19  -
Finally,  governments  should  adopt explicit  conservation  policies
that go beyond  the steps involved  in rational  energy  pricing.  Public
awareness  efforts,  audits  of energy  use in industry,  and other  methods  to
foster  energy  savings  also  should  be  promoted  and  supported.- 20  -
Reforming  Electric  Power  Policy  in  Developing  Countries
Mohan  Munasinghe  and  Robert  J.  Saunders
Introduction
Although  the  softening  of  world  oil  prices  in  1986  provided  relief
to  oil  importing  nations,  energy  related  problems  still  preoccupy  the  minds  of
decision  makers  in  most  developing  countries.  Most  of  the  key  energy  issues
identified  during  the past  decade  have not disappeared.  Thus,  developing
country energy investments  still average about 25% of  total public
investments;  oil  importers  still  spend  15-20%  of  export  earnings  on  petroleum
imports;  and fuelwood  shortages  and deforestation  problems,  especially  in
Africa  and  Asia,  continue  unabated.  Underlying  all  of  these  problems  is  the
need  to  provide  adequate  energy  resources  at  reasonable  cost  in  order  to  fuel
economic  development.  In  this  respect,  the  power  sector  has  been  acknowledged
as  a special  engine  for  growth.
The table below shows recent  energy  investment  requirements  in
several  developing  countries.  Of  the  total  energy  investmenc  requirement,  the
power  sector  generally  accounts  for  about  three-fourths.  If the  lower  oil
prices  were  to  cause  the  world  economy  to  expand,  as  would  be  expected  other
things  being  equal,  economic  growth  in  the  developing  countries  and  the  demand
for  their  exports  would  likely  increase  as  well. This,  in  turn,  would  spur
greater industrial  activity  and  demand for electricity  in developing
countries,  which  would  create  a need  for  evea  greater  investments  to  expand
supply  capacity.
Annual  Energy  Investment  as  a  Percentage
of  Total  Public  Investment
Be  low  20%  20-30S  30-40%  Over 40%
Egypt  Botswana  Ecuador  Argentina
Ethiopia  China  India  Brazil
Ghana  Costa  Rica  Pakistan  Colombia
Nigeria  Liberia  Philippines Korea
Sudan  Nepal  Turkey  Mexico
Note: Figures  apply  to  the  early  1980s.
Note: The  initial  draft  of  this  paper  was  presented  at  a conference  of  the
International  Association  of  Energy  Economists  in  Boston,
Massachusetts  in  November,  1986.- 21  -
Unfortunately, the performance  of  power utilities in  developing
countries has deteriorated  over the past few decades.  ALcompanying  this
deterioration  has been  a shift  towards  large,  monolithic  government  owned  and
operated utilities.  The  formation of these power utilities was based on
arguments relating to the need for:  economies of  scale in planning and
operations, improvements in coordination and  efficiency,  reduced reserve
margins and reliability  gains, larger  and longer  term investments,  political
pressures for nationalization  and elimination  of foreign ownership,  and so
on.  Although  some  of these  reasons  may be valid,  there  is  a growing  awareness
in third world countries  and in the development  community  that fundamental
change  is needed  to improve  efficiency  in the power  sector. There  appears  to
be special interest  in restructuring  the sector,  decentralizing  operations,
and  obtaining  greater  private  participation, as  ways  to  improve  the
performance  of power  utilities.
In the course of reforming the power sector,  developing  country
governments  also must be relieved  of the crippling  burden  of financing  the
deficits  created by inefficient  state-owned  electricity  enterprises.  This
need has  not  only increased pressures for  power sector reform but also
highlighted the  importance of  studying the  linkages between the  power
subsector, th- energy sector overall, and  the macro  economy.  Clearly,
effective  powe-  and  energy  strategies  cannot  be developed  in isolation.
Advantages  of an Integrated  Approach
A clear understanding  of economy-wide  energy  linkages  is vital,  no
matter  what type of political  system  prevails.  It will help decision  makers
in formulating  policies and providing  market signals and information  that
encourage  more efficient energy production  and use.  The scope of such a
framewiork  for integrated  national energy planning (INEP)  and supply-demand
management  may be clarified  by examining  the hierarchical  structure  depicted
in Figure  1.
At the highest  and most aggregate  level,  the energy  sector  must be
clearly  recognized  as part of the whole economy.  Therefore,  energy  planning
requires  analysis  of the links  between  the energy  sector  and  the rest of the
economy.  Such links include the energy needs of user groups, the input
requirements  of energy  producers,  and the impact  on the economy  of supply  and
pricing policies.  The second level of the integrated  approach treats the
energy  sector  as a separate  entity  composed  of subsectors  such  as electricity,
petroleum  products,  and so on.  This permits  d-;tailed  analysis,  with special
emphasis  on interactions  among the different  energy  subsectors,  substitution
possibilities,  and the resolution  of any resuLting policy conflicts.  The
third and most disaggregate  level pertains  to analysis  within each of  the
energy  subsectors. It is at this lowest  hierarchical  level  that most of the
detailed evaluation, planning, and  implementation  of  energy projects is
carried out by line institutions  (both public and private).  In practice,
however, the three levels of INEP overlap considerably.  Thus, the inter-
actions  of electric  power  problems  and linkages  at all three  levels  need  to be
carefully  examined.Figure  Is
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This integrated  framework  facilitates  policymaking  without  implying
rigid  centralized  planning.  The flexibility  of the process  should  result  in
the development  of a responsive  and up-to-date  energy strategy  designed to
meet national  goals.  The national  energy  strategy  (of  which a power invest-
ment program and pricing policy are important  elements)  may be implemented
through  a set of energy supply  and demand  management  policies  and programs
that  make effective  use of decentralized  market  forces  and  incentives.
The  policy instruments  available to  third world governments to
achieve  optimal energy  management  include:  (a)  physical  controls;  (b) tech-
nical  methods;  (c)  direct  investments  ~r  investment-inducing  policies;
(d)  education and  promotion;  and  (e)  pricing, taxes, subsidies,  and other
financial  incentives. Since  these  tools  are interrelated,  their  use should  be
closely  coordinated.
There are several  major constraints  to effective  policy  formulation
and  implementation  in  many  developing countries.  These  include:  (a)
inappropriate  government  interventions;  (b)  poor institutional  frameworks  and
inadequate  incentives  for efficient  management;  (c) insufficient  manpower  and
other  resources;  (d)  weak analytical  tools;  (e)  inadequate  policy  instruments;
and (f)  market  distortions  and low incomes.
Next, we examine specific  power subsector  issues  within the wider
INEP  framework  summarized  above.  It is convenient  to begin  by recalling  that
economic  efficiency  requires  both:  (a)  efficient  electricity  use  by providing
price  signals  that  ensure  optimal  consumption patterns  and  resource
allocation;  and (b)  efficient  production  of electricity  by ensuring  least-cost
supply through optional long-term investment  planning, as well as capable
shorter-term  power  system  operation  and management. Each of these  aspects  is
discussed  more fully  below.
Pricing  Policy
Fifteen  years ago, electric  power pricing  policy  in most countries
was determined  mainly  on the basis  of financial  or accounting  criteria,  e.g.,
raising  sufficient  sales  revenues  to meet operating  expenses  and  debt service
requirements,  while providing  a reasonable  contribution  towards  the capital
needed for future power system expansion.  In recent  years, however,  more
emphasis in developing countries has been placed on the use of economic
efficiency  principles. In particular,  a great  deal  of attention  has  been paid
to marginal  cost pricing  policies.
A comprehensive  approach  to power  pricing  recognizes  the existence
of several  objectives  or criteria, some of which are inconsistent.  First,
economic resources must be allocated efficientLy  not only among different
sectorb  of the  economy,  but  within  the electric  power  sector  itself. Second,
certain principles relating to  fairness and  equity must  be  satisfied,
including:  (a)  a fair allocation  of costs among consumers  according  to the
burdens they impose  on the system; (b)  assurance  of a reasonable  degree of
price  stability;  and (c)  provision  of  a minimum  level-of  service  to low-income- 24 -
power consumers  where  feasible.  Third,  power prices  should  raise sufficient
revenues to meet the financial  requirements  of the subsector.  Fourth, the
power tariff  structure  must be simple  enough to facilitate  the metering  and
billing of customers.  Finally,  political  requirements  sometimes  exist,  such
as subsidized  electricity  supply  to certain  sectors  or geographic  areas.
Since the above criteria  often conflict with one another, it is
necessary  to accept  certain  tradeoffs  among  them.  The long-run  marginal  cost
(LRMC)  approach to price setting  has both the analytical  rigor  and innerent
flexibility  to provide  a tariff  structure  that can be responsive  to most of
these  basic  objectives. In the  first  stage  of calculating  LRMC,  the  economic
(first-best)  efficiency  objectives  of tariff  setting  are pursued  because  the
method  of calculation  is based  on estimates  of future  economic  resource  costs
(rather  than sunk costs)  and it can incorporate  economic  considerations  such
as  shadow prices and  externalities.  The  structuring  of marginal costs
attempts  an efficient  and fair allocation  of the tariff  burden  on consumers.
In the second  stage  of developing  an LRMC-based  tariff,  deviations  from  strict
LRMC are considered  in order to meet important  financial,  as well as social,
economic (second-best), and  political criteria.  This  second  stage  of
adjusting the  strict LRMC  is generally as  important as  the  first-stage
calculation,  especially  in the  context  of developing  countries.
The  LRMC approach provides an explicit framework for  analyzing
system costs and setting tariffs.  If departures  from the strict  LRMC are
required  for  non-economic  reasons,  then  the  economic  efficiency  cost of these
deviations  may be estimated,  even  on a rough  basis,  by comparing  the  impact  of
the modified tariff relative  to the (benchmark)  strict  LRMC.  Furthermore,
since  the  cost structure  may  be studied  in considerable  detail  during  the  LRMC
calculations,  this  analysis  helps  to pinpoint  weaknesses  and  inefficiencies  in
the various parts of the power system,  such as over-investment,  unbalanced
investment  or excessive  losses  at the  generation,  transmission,  and distribu-
tion levels  in  different  geographic  areas. This aspect  is particularLy  useful
in system-expansion  planning.
Finally,  any LRMC-based  tariff  is a compromise  among  many different
objectives.  Therefore, there is no "ideal" tariff.  By using the LRMC
benchmark  approach, it is possible to revise and improve the tariff on a
consistent  and ongoing  basis and thereby  approach  an efficiency  based price
over a period  of several  years.  This protects  long-standing  consumers  from
having  to absorb  large,  abrupt  price  changes  all at once.  Recent  advances  in
low  cost metering  and switching  equipment,  which  have made possible  selective
spot pricing  and better  load control,  have made it possible  to consider  more
sophisticated  approaches  to balancing  supply  and  demand  when  appropriate.
Investment  Policy
Efficiency based pricing of electricity  (based on marginal cost
principles)  assumes  that  the  power  system  is optimally  planned  and efficiently
operated.  This is important,  even from  a  practical  point  of view, since an
inefficient  power  utility that is routinely  permitted  to pass on excessively- 25 -
high costs to consumers,  under the umbrella  of marginal  cost pricing,  will
have very little incentive to reduce costs and produce more efficiently.
There are-  also a number  of solid  analytical  reasons  for insisting  on supply
efficienc.y  as a  prerequisite  to LRMC-based  pricing.  These are discussed
below.
Optimal  Reliability  and  Traditional  Least  Cost  Planning
As stated  earlier,  decision  makers  in the  electric  power  sector  are
concerned principally with  investment and  pricing policies.  The  close
relationship  between  optimal investment  and pricing  policies  has been recog-
nized  for some  time.  However,  recent  theoretical  work  has emphasized  that  the
optimal  conditions  for  price  and  capacity  levels  must be simultaneously  satis-
fied to  maximize  the  net social  benefits  of electricity  consumption. In this
context,  determining  the optimal  capacity  level  is equivalent  to establishing
the  optimal level  of  reliability since  capacity additions do  improve
reliability.
The complex  analysis  underlying  the  joint  optimality  conditions  can
be summarized  simply,  as follows. The optimal  price  is equal to the  marginal
cost of supply.  Simultaneously,  the optimal  reliability  (capacity)  level is
defined  by the point  at which the  marginal  cost of increasing  reliability  is
exactly  equal to the corresponding  decline in outage costs incurred  by con-
sumers  subject  to power  failures,  poor voltage,  and frequency  variations. In
conventional  economic  analysis,  the  short-run  marginal  cost (SRMC)  is the  cost
of meeting  additional  electricity  consumption,  with capacity  fixed,  while the
LRMC  is  the  cost  of  providing an  increase in  consumption (sustained
indefinitely into  the  future)  in  a  situation where  optimal  capacity
adjustments  are possible.  When the system  is optimally  planned  and operated
(i.e.,  capacity  and reliability  are optimal),  SRMC and LRMC coincide.  How-
ever,  if the system  plan is sub-optimal,  significant  deviations  between  SRMC
and  LRMC will have to  be resolved within the  pricing policy framework.
Finally,  if there  are substantial  outage  costs  outside  the peak  period, then
the optimal marginal capacity costs may be allocated among the different
rating  periods  (i.e.,  peak, intermediate,  and off-peak)  in proportion  to the
corresponding  marginal  outage  costs.
Except  under special  conditions  (e.g.,  when spot pricing is feas-
ible),  electricity  tariffs  often are not readily subject  to change, so the
simultaneous  optimization of  price and  capacity is a  theoretical ideal.
Therefore,  from a practical  Point,  of view, it n.ay  be appropriate  (or n.eces-
sary)  to separate  the joint price  and reliability  optimization  conditions  by
attempting to "optimize" reliability in  che  presence of  fixed  or given
tariffs, at least on  the first round.  Once the optimal reliability  and
investment  levels  (subject  to given prices  as defined  above)  are determined,
tariffs can be  revised to  reflect any  chang-s in the marginal cost of
supplying  electricity  implied  by the new reliability  level.  Using this new
level of  tariffs and  resulting demand, reliability  and  capacity can  be
reoptimized  iteratively.  We  note that application of  the marginal cost
pricing  rule has  been attempted  in several  industrial  countries  (most  notably
France),  and  while interpretations  vary among  practitioners,  the  approach  has
gained  wide acceptability. The optimal  reliability  rule is more difficult  to- 26 -
apply.  This is mainly because shortage costs are not easy to estimate,
although considerable  progress  has been made in estimating these costs in
recent  years.
It must be emphasized that the reliability  (or supply quality)
optimization  model strengthens  rather than replaces the conventional  least
cost  criterion. In the conventional  approach to power system design and
planning, costs  are  minimized subject to  supplying the  load  at  some
(arbitrarily)  given standard  of supply.  With the revised  approach, it is
possible  to determine  an optimal reliability  level,  by using a social  cost-
benefit approach  (based on  a  national rather  than  a  utility-specific
viewpoint)  to evaluate  the inherent  trade-off  between the increase  in power
system  supply  costs  required  to achieve  a higher  level  of reliability,  and the
corresponding  decline  in consumer  shortage  costs.  It would be possible  then
to design the power system to meet the forecast  load, subject to the new
reliability  requirement,  using  the  traditional  least-cost  planning
techniques. This  would  permit  the  application  of existing  sophisticated  least
cost  system  planning  models.
Finally,  it is worthwhile  noting that che present  decision  making
climate is characterized  by high levels  of uncertainty  with regard  to trade
and  economic conditions, energy  prices, future demand, interest rates,
currency values, and  technological  change.  Consequently, there is much
greater scope in developing  countries to use models which identify risk-
diversifying  energy policy options that are robust over a  wide range of
exogenous scenarios, rather than cost minimizing,  deterministic  but risky
solutions  that were more appropriate  for the narrower  band of eventualities
which  existed  in the  past.
Institutional  and  Financing  Options
In designing  energy  policies  to stimulate  a more efficient  use of
national resources  under a broader range of possible  economic conditions,
developing  country  decision makers  have  a  number  of  alternatives to
consider.  These include  both attacking  institutional  efficiency  issues and
considering  new  financing methods.  Among  the ways  in which developing
countries might improve the efficiency  of their public energy enterprises
could be to allow them greater  autonomy  and institute  management  reforms,  or
could  be to restructure  them  and decentralize  some  of their  functions.
Greater  Autonomy  and  Management  Reforms
Although many difficulties  have plagued developing  country power
utilities,  probably  the  most pervasive  has been undue  government  interference
in organizational  and operational  matters.  Such interference  has adversely
affected  least  cost  procurement  and investment  decisions,  hampered  attempts  to
raise prices to economic efficiency  levels,  mandated low salaries  tied to
civil service levels, and promoted excessive staffing. This in turn  has
resulted  in management  who are not held accountable,  the loss  of experienced
staff due to uncompetitive  employment  conditions  and poor job satisfaction,
weak planning  and demand  forecasting,  inefficient  operation  and maintenance,
high losses,  and poor  financial  monitoring,  controls,-and  revenue  collection.- 27 -
In order  to address  these  difficulties,  an important  principle  must
be recognized--that  the complexity  of energy problems  and the scarcity of
resources  and  managerial  talent  in  developing  countries  requires  that each set
of issues  be dealt  with at that level  of decision  making  and  management  best
suited to  analyzing the  difficulty and  implementing the  solution. This
hierarchical approach corresponds closely to  the  INEP concept developed
earlier in this paper.  Thus, political  decision  makers, senior government
officials,  and ministry level staff should  focus on critical  macroeconomic
issues  and energy sector strategy  and policy, in order to determine global
expectations  of power  utility  performance. The senior  management  of a power
company, appropriately  buffered by an  independent  board of directors and
operating in a  known regulatory framework, would then conduct its daily
operations free from government interference,  to meet the overall policy
objectives  and service  targets  within the regulatory  guidelines.  As far as
possible,  the utility  management  should  be assured  of continuity  at the top,
even in the  face of political  change. While the  enterprise  is  provided  wider
autonomy,  it would become  more accountable  in terms of performance  measured
against an agreed set of specific  objectives  and monitored  indicators. The
senior management of the  power enterprise  would be well advised to meet
regularly  with  government  and  consumer  representatives,  to discuss  performance
problems  and  successes.
In  introducing such a  structure, initial changes in  enterprise
management  may  be required, to mirror changes in the utility's external
environment.  The  enterprise's  internal  organizational structure  and
procedures  may also be inadequate.  Once again, the fundamental  principles
that will help to address these problems  are delegation  of authority and
accountability.
In many developing  country power utilities,  the senior  management
attempts to  deal with all  problems, and  trivial issues often  get  more
attention  than critical  ones.  If middle-level  managers  could be adequately
trained, senior managers could  (by appropriate  delegation  of  tasks) free
themselves  to deal  with  higher  level  strategic  initiatives.  Middle  management
would  become accountable for  its  performance through an  agreed  set  of
performance  indicators,  while  obtaining  greater  responsibility  and latitude  to
make decisions.  This process  could be repeated  down to the lowest  working
levels.  Obviously,  staff training  and education  at all levels  and stages  of
career  development  would  play a critical  role in ensuring  the  success  of such
an approach.
Restructuring  and  Decentralization
The  natural monopoly  characteristics  of  some  power  enterprise
functions,  and government's  willingness  to manipulate  these  enterprises  for
general  policy  purposes,  are in many countries  accepted  as sufficient  reasons
for  maintaining  large  centralized  public  sector  organizations. Nevertheless,
the  observed  problems  inherent  in  motivating  the  managers  of state  enterprises
in  developing  countries  to be cost  conscious,  innovative,  and  be responsive  to
consumer  needs indicate  a  need for more fundamental  change.  It could be
worthwhile  to trade off some of the perceived  economies  of scale in energy
enterprises  for  other  organizational  structures  which-provide  greater  built-in- 28 -
incentives  for management efficiency  and  responsiveness  to consumers.  In
particular,  varying  the  forms of  ownership  and regulation  in the power  sector
should  be considered.
As long as a given regulatory  framework  prevails,  it can be argued
that the form of ownership (private  or public)  does not, by itself,  affect
operating  efficiency.  The main point is that, to the extent  possible, the
introduction  of management  efficiency  incentives  such  as those brought  about
by competitive  market forces  should  be encouraged. Options for private  and
cooperative  ownership of energy enterprises  could include both local and
foreign  participation  as well as joint ventures.  Governments  may wish to
divest  themselves  of either  all or part of their ownership  and control  over
certain enterprises,  functions,  or organizational  structures.  Thus, they
might provide  an environment  in which governments,  enterprise  managers, and
energy  consumers  are all better  off.  A first step towards  decentralization
could  be for  government-owned  power  enterprises  to competitively  contract  out
activities  or functions  which are better  handled  by others.  Many companies
already  subcontract  various  construction-related  activities. Some  portions  of
the billing  and collection  process,  or routine  maintenance,  are on occasion
also subcontracted. These arrangements  usually  have the advantages  of lower
costs  and greater  programming  flexibility.
There are  also opportunities  for decentralization  on a  spatial
basis.  For example, larger countries  may have independent  regional power
grids.  Power  distribution  companies  could be separate  by municipality,  with
perhaps  limited  overlap  in some fringe  franchise  areas,  and have the  right  to
purchase  from  various  suppliers,  when feasible. If private  participation  were
allowed, large power  consumers might  also be  able to  become legitimate
shareholders  who would  be concerned  not only  with service  efficiency  but  also
with  the  financial  viability  of the  power  company.
In power  generation,  there  is potential  for  efficiency  improvements
through divestiture.  While  the bulk power transmission  and distribution
functions  might be regarded  as having  more natural  monopoly  common carrier-
type characteristics,  this is not so with generation.  In fact, there is
substantial scope  for  competition in  power generation with  independent
(perhaps  foreign-owned  enclave)  producers  selling  to  a central  grid,  as in the
case  of large industrial  cogeneration. For example,  in the U.S.,  the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of  1978 (PURPA) specifically  encourages
small,  privately-owned  suppliers  to generate  electricity  in various  ways for
sale to the public  grid.  As a result,  there  are now  a'large number  of small
companies  producing  electricity,  presumably  with marginal  costs below those
incurred  by  traditional  large utilities.  Similar laws have been passed
elsewhere  and  are  beginning  to have  an impact.
Appropriate legislation and  innovative contractual arrangements
could broaden the scope for cogeneration  and free generation  in developing
countries. Larger  countries  might  find small  entrepreneurs  ready  to invest  in
small hydro or similar generation  facilities.  The advantage to the power
company  would be a  deemphasis  on large, lumpy, capital-intensive  projects,
together  with the fact that the cogeneration  and free generation  companies
would  put up all or part of the capital  and be paid  only  out of r venues  from- 29 -
power sold at guaranteed  prices.  For larger  enclave generation facilities
(perhaps  peat,  coal or nuclear),  the concept  would  be that a foreign  investor
finance  and  build  the  plant,  operate  and  maintain  it for  an agreed  period,  and
be repaid  out of power sold  at formula  based  guaranteed  prices. A portion  of
the revenue  would have to be convertible  into foreign currency  and agreed
profits  allowed  to be repatriated.
Financing  Options
Given debt problems  and resource  constraints,  developing  countries
increasingly  are considering  more innovative  financing  options,  some of which
have been used  in the  industrialized  countries.  Some of  the  financial
instruments  that are  now  being  studied in third world nations include:
(a)  non-recourse and  limited  recourse  financing  (or  project-specific
financing);  (b)  leasing  of individual  pieces  of equipment  or whole plants,  by
local  or foreign  investors;  (c)  private  ownership  or operation  of generation
and distribution  facilities;  (d)  counter  trade,  involving  barter  type  exchange
of  specific export  goods  for  energy  imports; (e)  developing  financial
instruments  to finance local costs, often involving the creation of  new
financial  intermediaries;  (f)  revenue bonds,  with yields tied to enterprise
profitability;  (g)  tax-exempt  bonds; and (h)  sale of electricity  futures, to
those  that  seek  more stable,  longer  term  electricity  price  contracts.
The Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Agency (MICA),  being created
by the  World  Bank,  could  also play a key role  beginning  in 1988.  This agency
will seek  to promote  the flow  of international  capital  to  developing  countries
by providing  guarantees  (on  a fee basis)  against  the following  non-commercial
forms  of risk:  (a)  transfer  risk, arising  from  host government  restrictions
against convertibility and  transfer of  foreign exchange; (b)  loss risk,
resulting  from legislative  or administrative  action  (or  omission)  of the host
government  that leads  to loss  of ownership,  control  or benefits;  (c)  contract
repudiation  risk, when the outside investor  has no recourse  to an adequate
forum,  faces undue  delays,  or is unable  to enforce  a favorable  judgment;  and
(d)  war  and civil  disturbance  risk.
The Issues: A Summary
If electric  power is to be available  to feed the growth engine  of
the  developing  world, adequate financing,  optimum planning, and efficient
organization  and management  are the key areas  to be addressed.  These items
are interrelated  and as time  passes,  addressing  them head on is becoming  more
and  more  critical.- 30  -
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Alternative  Ways  of Financing  Power  Systems
Anthony  A. Churchill
Traditional  Financing  Sources
In the developed  countries,  where well-established  electric  power
systems  exist,  the demand  for electric  power is unlikely  to grow at anything
like the rates being experienced  in the developing  countries.  Technology,
demographics,  and  the  lower marginal energy requirements of high  income
societies all  work  together to moderate the  increase in the demand for
energy.  However,  these  same factors  will insure  a continued  rapid  growth  in
the demand for energy ard, in particular,  electric  power in the developing
countries.  Over the next decade the developing  countries  will account for
increasing  shares  of additional  electric  power  installed.
The price of oil and alternative  fuels  will determine  the types  of
plant  to be built,  but regardless  of plant  type, the  major  requirement  is  for
capital. Few  outputs  are  as capital-intensive  as electric  power.
Prior to World War  II, much of this capital  was financed  through
private  means.  Power  companies  generally  were privately  owned  and relied  on
both domestic  and foreign  capital  markets to raise the necessary  resources.
Following  the War, rapid  growth in demand  and the recognition  by governments
of the importance  of this sector  to general economic  growth resulted  in a
greater  reliance  on public sources  of capital.  Most companies  became state
enterprises relying on  government savings and  credit  to  finance their
expansion. The  World Bank  was an important  part  of this  process. Most of the
power systems in the developing  countries have received, and continue to
receive, substantial support from  the  Bank  and  other  multilateral and
bilateral funding institutions.  There is increasing  recognition,  however,
that these sources of capital are no longer adequate to meet growing and
urgent  needs,  for three  reasons.
First, as  these countries have expanded their economies,  as they
have  become  more urbanized  and more industrialized, the  absolute  size  of the
capital requirements  for electric power have grown many times larger than
those  of primarily  rural  societies  just beginning  the growth  process.  Today
there are single  power projects  which, in real terms,  require  more capital
than the total funds  available  from the Bank in any one year in the 1950s  or
1960s.
Note:  The initial  draft  of this  paper  was presented  at the symposium:
"International  Build  Own and  Operate  Projects,"  held in  London  on
February  6, 1987.- 32  -
Second, the growth process has  placed enormous demands upon the
limited  resources  of the public  sector. The power sector  is only  one  of many
claimants.  Today it is not unusual to find from  one-quarter  to one-third  of
public investment  resources going to electric power.  And it is still not
enough.
Third,  the experience  of the last few decades  has revealed  many of
the  disadvantages  of relying  on public  ownership  and public  credit.  In spite
of valiant attempts, it has not always been possible  to isolate the power
sector  from the inherent  inefficiencies  of government. These inefficiencies
can be  costly  in  a sector  as capital-intensive  as electric  power.  The failure
to adequately  maintain  costly  plant  and  equipment,  for  example,  can  result  not
only in loss of the equipment  but  also loss in the output  of other  firms for
which  power  is a critical  input.
Alternatives  to  Traditional  Sources
Several things  need to be done--both  to raise the capital  required
and to improve the efficiency  with which it is used.  The improvements  in
efficiency  are the key to facilitating  change.  Without the improvements  in
efficiency,  there  are few additional  benefits  to be shared  between  investors,
owners,  and consumers.
For  governments,  the  most  obvious  advantage  of  considering
alternative financing mechanisms is  the  additional capital that can  be
raised.  Efficiency  concerns  are generally  of secondary  importance. For the
investor,  it is simply  the rate of return  appropriately  discounted  for risk.
Efficiency  is only important  to the  extent  that  it reduces  risks  or raises  the
rate of return.  In both cases efficiency  concerns  play  a secondary  role to
the primary  motives  of both parties. This is  unfortunate  because  both  parties
will  gain only if risks  and  efficiency  are appropriately  balanced.
Raising  Additional  Capital
Consider  first  the  matter  of  raising additional  capital  or
investment  funds.  Unless investors  are willing to put some of their own
capital  or credit  at risk,  there is little  to be gained  by the governmenAt  in
entering into agreements for private participation  in plant ownership and
operation. Demands  by investors  for  government  guarantees  on capital  and debt
simply  shift the burden to the government's  limited credit resources,  with
little  or no perceived  benefits  to the government.  In fact, the political
costs  may be considerable.  Existing  institutions  in the power  business  are
likely  to resist  any shifting  of responsibilities.  Questions  concerning  loss
of sovereignty  will inevitably  be raised.
If governments  wish to raise additional  funds, they must make it
attractive  enough for investors  to be willing to take on some of the credit
risks.  This means providing an investment  climate in which investors  are
willing to take normal commercial  risks.  Instability  of pricing policies,
including  foreign  exchange,  lack  of  political  stability,  poor  past- 33 -
performance,  and a host of other  factors  increases  the risks  to investors  in
nost  countries and  therefore raises  the  costs  of  private capital  to
government.
Improving  the general investment  climate is an obvious first step
but, in practice, a difficult  one  to iccomplish.  Given the past record,
investors'  expectations  are likely  to change  only slowly. The process  must be
one where small steps are taken to improve  confidence  and to allow private
investors  gradually  to share in a greater  proportion  Jf the  risks.  Attempts
to do too  much too  quickly  will  disappoint  both governments  and investors.
This is where focusing  on the efficiency  gains can be important.
Identifying the  net  gains  to be  shared by  inviting private capital to
participate  in the ownership  and  operation  of plants  can be an important  first
step  in introducing  a  more realistic  framework  at the  bargaining  table. These
gains  can  be found  in a number  of places.
Identifying  Efficiency  Gains
The sources  of gain  will vary from country  to country  but  most will
be found  where  the  private  sector  is able to build  and  operate  plants  at lower
cost and  with improved  reliability. These  lower  costs  can be the result  of a
variety  of factors,  from improved  procurement  practices  to better  incentives
for labor  and management.  A casual examination  of the costs  and performance
of typical developing country utilities suggests the potential gains are
significant  and could  result  in cost reductions  of 25-50Z.
How these gains are to be shared and exchanged is a matter for
bargaining. The  more that investors  demand  in protection  from  exchange  risks,
profit  repatriation,  etc., the  less interest  the  government  has in sharing  in
the gains.  Similarly, the more that governments  frustrate the investor's
attempts  to improve  efficiency,  for  example,  through  customs  procedures,  labor
requirements,  etc., the less interest  the investor  has in taking  any risk.
Both parties  need to be flexible  and aware  of the  needs  of the  other.
Governments,  in particular,  need to be aware  not just  of the  present
deal but  also of its  impact  on future  negotiations. There  may be ways  for the
present,  perhaps  modest, gains in additional  capital  and improved  efficiency
to be parlayed  into even more gains in the future.  In this manner, the
experience  may be used to establish  a new  way of  doing  business.
A  common feature of the bargaining  process  usually is a  lack of
imagination  on the part of all parties  concerned. Determination  to give  away
nothing and  to  take no  risks  is hardly the atmosphere in which growth
promoting  changes  are likely  to occur.  Mutual suspicion  usually  leads  to bad
bargains.
There  are  several elements that  go  into  establishing a  more
imaginative  bargaining framework.  The capital markets of most developing
countries  are often  more underdeveloped  than necessary. There  is generally  a
great shortage of readily tradable securities,  and  local investors often
prefer to deposit their assets in foreign banks.  Yet if one studies the- 34 -
history  of North American  and European  capital  markets,  the issuing  of
securities  by large public  companies  provided  the very foundations  for
developing  the  capital  markets.  Developing  countries  generally  have  precluded
this  possibility  by making  the  financing  of these  public  works  an exclusive
prerogative  of  the  treasury.
Encouraging  Local  Private  Investment
The possibility  of expanding  the increased  interest  in private
foreign  investment  to include  local  private  investors  should  be explored.
This  system  has  a  number  of  advantages  for  all  concerned.  For  the  government,
the encouragement  of the local capital  market has to be an  important
developmental  goal. For  local  investors,  joining  in  with  a large,  partially
foreign-financed  enterprise  may  offer  an  attractive  alternative  to  Miami  bank
deposits. For both the  government  and the  foreign  investor,  raising  some
capital  in the  domestic  market  may  resolve  some  of  the  difficult  issues  over
repatriation  of profits  and convertibility  of local  c.'rrencies.  For the
government,  the  existence  of local  interests  may ease  some  of the  political
problems  and, at the same time,  provide  some assurances  to the foreign
investor  to  know  that  his  interests  coincide  with  local  interests.
In  practice,  there are  many ways  to  enlist local private
financing.  The  number  of special  incentives  that  have  to  be  offered  to  local
investors  will depend  on the state of the local  capital  market.  Local
investors  may  be  willing  to  accept  shares  valued  in  local  currency  as long  as
dividends  receive  the  same  type  of  treatment  given  the  foreign  owners--perhaps
in foreign  exchange.  The foreign  shareholders  could be permitted  (or
required)  to sell (or  buy) part of their  shares  each year in the local
market. Foreign  banks  now  holding  non-performing  government  loans  could  be
encouraged  to swap these  debts for equity  or other forms of financial
participation.
The  objective  is  to  establish  a local  market  in  which  shares  or  debt
instruments  held  by both local  and foreign  nationals  can be traded.  The
existence  of such  a market  will improve  the  liquidity  and  acceptability  of
private  participation  in  power  and similar  types  of investments,  as well  as
provide  a channel  for  encouraging  local  savings.
Obtaining  local private  financing  does require,  however,  that
governments  be prepared  to negotiate  over  a broader  range  of  issues  than  is
typically  the  case  where  negotiations  are left  to the  national  power  company
and  the  interested  invescors.  The  Ministry  of  Finance  and  other  parts  of  the
government  need  to be  party  to the  negotiations  so that  the  broader,  Longer
range  interests  of  the  country  can  be  taken  into  account.
Other  areas  may have been  overlooked  in the relationship  between
potential  investors  and  governments  and  their  national  monopolies.  One  of  the
unique  features  of  the  electricity  sector  is  the  existence  usually  of  only  one
purchaser  of  the  output.  This  puts  a  great  deal  of  stress  on  the  negotiations
over  what quantities  are to be sold,  at what times,  and at what price.
Investors  try  to  minimize  the  risks  through  some  form  of  take  or  pay  contract
with  various  provisions  to  insure  the  pass-through  of  cost  uncertainties  such- 35 -
as changes  in  fuel  prices  or  exchange  rates. In  these  cases,  the  investors
are  simply  suppliers  of  a product  where  risks  are  minimized  and  profit  margins
guaranteed  by the  government. Incentives  for  improved  efficiency  and any
entrepreneurial  activiti1s  are  kept  to  a  minimum.
Clearly  this  c  *. be improved  upon.  Countries  might  well  benefit
from  some  loosening  up of the  market  structure.  For  example,  it  may  not be
necessary  for foreign  investors  to be relegated  merely  to supplying  base
load.  Many developing  countries  are far froma  the point of needing  the
national  grid  to  extend  to  all  parts  of  the  country.  Perhaps  investors  (both
local  and  foreign)  could  be  invited  to  supply  and  distribute  power  in  isolated
markets,  in competition  with the national  monopoly. Or private  owners  of
plants  might  be  allowed  to  expand  their  markets  at their  own  risk,  perhaps  to
large  industrial  consumers. Alternatively,  plant  owners  might  invest  with
large  industrial  users  in  cogeneration  of heat  and  electricity,  selling  some
of the  power  to  the  grid  or  to  other  consumers.
There  are  undoubtedly  other  variations  of  market  structure  that  can
be used  to enhance  the opportunities  for  entrepreneurial  activities  in the
sector.  There  is  equally  little  doubt  that  existing  institutions  in  the  power
sector  will  oppose  such  moves. Technical,  safety,  and  other  reasons  will  be
given,  some  valid,  some  not.  Experierce  in  the  developed  countries  suggests
that  many  of  the  problems  can  be  solved  and  that  large  gains  in  efficiency  are
possible.  Again,  it  requires  that  governments  examine  the  whole  question  of
private  investment  in this  sector  from  a much  broader  perspective  than is
presently  the  case.
The  World Bank is  interested  in  exploring  these and  other
opportunities  for  improving  the  investment  climate for private sector
participation  in the power sector.  It is clear that  the future  capital
demands  of this  sector  require  a reexamination  of the  premises  under  which
most  capacity  has  been  installed  and  operated  in  recent  decades. The  World
Bank  has  a  role  to  play  in  this  process.
World  Bank  Ro t.e
Nearly  four  decades  of continuous  investment  in  this  sector  places
the  World  Bank  in  a  unique  position  to  be  able  to  encourage  existing  utilities
to  accept  a  greater  degree  of  diversity  and  competition  in  the  sector.  It  can
advise  them  on  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of the  many  alternatives  open
to  them. It  can  support,  through  financial  and  other  means,  their  efforts  to
adapt  to  the  requirements  of  a changing  environment.
But more  important  will be  the Bank's efforts to  persuade
governments  to broaden  their  whole  approach  to private  investments  in this
sector. Governments  will  need  assistance  to insure  that  the  process  fully
takes into account  the legitimate  concerns  of the public,  that private
monopolies  are  not  simply  substituted  for  public  monopolies.  All  of  this  will
require  a regulatory  framework  that  does  not  yet  exist  in  most  countries.  For
the most part, there are no rules governing  the performance  of private- 36  -
operators. In many cases,  their  operatio-s  are prohibited. Governments  will
be reluctant  to expand  private sector  participation  without some assurances
that, first,  the benefits  are sufficiently  large,  and second,  that adequate
controls  can  be developed  to safeguard  public  interests.
The World Bank also has a variety  of direct  and indirect  means to
support  private investors.  The new Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Agency
(MIGA),  soon  to be in operation,  should  be able to insure  against  some  of the
risks  faced  by foreign  investors  when dealing  with  sovereign  governments. The
Bank's  participation  in the funding  of privately  sponsored  projects  can also
ease investors'  concerns. This can  be done  directly  through  the  participation
of the IFC  as one of the  parties  in a joint  venture,  or more indirectly  by the
Bank funding  the government  or its  power  agency's  share  in  any such  venture.
But more important  than any of these measures  will be the Bank's
efforts  to assure  all parties  involved  that their  legitimate  interests  can  be
adequately  taken  into  account  and  safeguarded  within  a framework  that  provides
mutual  benefits  to all.  This can be don- by providing  a technical  appraisal
of the costs  and benefits  of the  alternatives,  by bringing  to the attention  of
all concerned  what has worked  and has not  worked  in other countries,  and, in
general,  by providing  its good offices  to assist  in reaching  agreements  based
on  mutual  trust  and understanding.- 37  -
Financial  Investments  in  the  Petroleum  Industry
Philippe  Bourcier
Introduction
The precipitous  drop in international  crude  oil prices  has had  a
most  pervasive  effect  on the economies  of all countries  and has raised  a
special  new set  of problems  for  the  developing  countries.  The  oil  exporting
countries  are  faced  with  large  reductions  in  foreign  exchange  earnings  which
threaten  their financial  viability.  The oil  importing  countries  are
benefitting  from  lower  oil  prices  but  still  find  it  difficult  to  provide  the
amount  of  energy supplies  needed to support  their economic  growth  at
reasonable  cost.
This  paper  presents  an  historical  view  of the  energy  situation  in
developing  countries,  focusing  on the constraints  that  will affect  their
investment  decisions  and the difficulties  associated  with planning  in a
climate  of  uncertain  oil  prices.  It  highlights  the  difficulties  in  mobilizing
financial  resources  for  energy  development  at a time  when  they  are  becoming
more  scarce.  The  paper  also  suggests  adjustments  that  might  be  needed  to  make
the  energy  sector  more competitive  and efficient  and thus attractive  to
outside  investors. It identifies  the World  Bank's  role in assisting  the
developing  countries  in  resolving  these  important  issues.
Historical  Perspective
The low oil prices  of the 1960s  and early  1970s  led  to a rapid
increase  in  oil  consumption,  the  substitution  by  industry  of  fuel  oil  for  coal
on  a  massive  scale,  and  increased  reliance  on  imports--often  at  the  expense  of
domestic  production.  At the  same  time,  large  investments  were  made in the
downstream  sector  (refining  and  power  generation)  to  support  economic  growth.
Demand-Side  Effects
The  situation  changed  as a result  of the  1973-74  embargo.  On the
demand side, industry  switched  to  alternative  energy sources  such as
hydropower,  nuclear  energy,  coal,  natural  gas,  and  geothermal  energy. Where
possible,  oil burning  facilities,  such  as power  and cement  plants,  were
modified  to  burn  coal  or,  to  a lesser  extent,  domestic  natural  gas. This
Note: The  initial  draft  of  this  paper  was  prepared  for  The  World  Petroleum
Conference  held  in  Paris  in  November  1986.- 38  -
practice  was  followed  even if  the  high  investment  costs  of  conversion  were  not
fully justified by  the  fuel cost savings or the age of  the facility.
Industrial  consumers,  under  pressure  of  higher  energy  prices,  also invested  in
energy  saving  measures  such  as more efficient  manufacturing  processes,  heat
recovery,  and better  insulation. The housing  sector,  especially  in colder
climates, reduced its  oil  demand by  switching fuels and  by  improving
insulation.  Only in the  transport  sector  was there  no effective  substitution
made for petroleum  fuels.  The impact  of these  measures  affected  primarily
industrial  countries.  although  it  was  also  felt  in  LDCs  when  oil  demand  slowed
down  to  historical  lows.
In  high  consuming  industrialized  and  developing  countries,  interfuel
substitution  and conservation  reduced  the shaee  of oil consumption  in total
primary  energy  consumption  from  49%  in 1973  to  41%  in 1984. In the  developing
countries  alone,  the share  of *il consumption  dropped  from  50.7%  in 1973 to
44% in 1984.  In terms  of volume,  however,  world  oil consumption  increased
from  about  2.3  billion  tons  in 1973  to  some  2.9  billion  tons  in 1984.
The oil  producing  industry  responded  to the  high  prices  of the  post
1973-1974  period  by shifting  their  investment  from  the  downstream  to upstream
facilities. In LDCs, public  sector  resources  were committed  to exploration
and  production activities, thereby capturing the  economic rents  from
indigenous  production  rather  than  relying  on imports. In  the  process,  the  oil
industry  brought  into production  relatively  high-cost  oil when compared  to
production  costs  in  many  OPEC  countries.  The  development  of small  fields  with
higher  production  costs, deep drilling  projects  onshore  and offshore,  and
investment  in enhanced  oil recovery  projects  and  in "stripper"  wells all
contributed  to the  flow of higher  cost  oil.  During  this  period,  most  of the
increase  in supply  came from  non-OPEC  oil-exporting  developing  countries,  led
by  Mexico. There  were  considerable  production  increases  in  other  countries  as
well, notably  Egypt,  Malaysia,  Oman,  and the  People's  Republic  of China  and
more recently,  Colombia  and  ;dorth  Yemen.
Production  of  Petroleum  in  Non-OPEC  Oil-Exporting  Developing  Countries
(Million  tons)
Country  1973  1979  1984
Angola  8.1  7.2  10.3
Bahrain  3.4  2.6  2.3
Brunei  11.4  13.1  8.2
Cameroon  --  2.0  6.5
China  53.6  106.2  114.6
Congo  2.1  2.8  6.0
Egypt  8.5  25.5  41.9
Malaysia  4.3  13.6  21.7
Mexico  25.8  80.9  152.8
Oman  14.6  14.6  20.0
Peru  3.5  9.5  9.1
Syria  5.5  8.7  9.5
Trinidad  and  Tobago  8.8  11.1  8.8
Tunisia  3.9  5.5  5.5
Total  153.5  303.3  417.2
Source: United  Nations  Energy  Statistics;  World  Baak Data.- 39  -
In the oil-importing  developing  countries,  Brazil and India have
been responsible  for most of the production  increase;  in Brazil,  production
rose from 8.4  million tons in 1979 to 23.7  million  tons in 1984; in India,
production  rose  from 12.8  million  tons to 28 million  tons.
To  develop these  resources, the  petroleum industry (including
national  oil companies  of developing  countries)  spent  an unprecedented  sum  on
exploration  and production. The exact tally  is unknown,  but a large  share  of
these investments  in LDCs was financed through external borrowings  which
contributed  to the current debt crisis.  This policy  of debt financing  was
justified by the  expectation  that prices would remain high and  that the
exploration  for  and  development  of domestic  resources  would remain  financially
and  economically  attractive. At the same  time,  the  international  oil  industry
increased  its capital expenditure,  particularly  in upstream  exploration  and
production  in  non-OPEC  countries,  thus providing  additional  sources  of capital
to  LDCs.
Outlook
Any discussion  of future  energy  investment  and related  issues  must
make assumptions  about  oil prices  and supply  and demand  balances. While  this
is difficult  to do, the World Bank believes  that prices are unlikely  to go
back  up to the  pre-1979  levels  in the  medium  term.
Along with the low forecasts  fcr oil prices,  the share  of petroleum
in the global  consumption  of commercial  energy is projected  to continue  to
decline  from about 40% in 1985 to around  33-35%  in 2000.  This trend  assumes
that the investments  in energy  conservation,  improved  efficiency,  and fuel
substitution  will continue,  albeit at a reduced  pace.  The conservation  and
fuel substitution  measures  taken  prior to 1985 are unlikely  to be reversed.
Also, most consuming countries  are not expected  to pass through  the entire
decline  in oil prices  to final  consumers.  In the  transportation  sector,  the
increased  fuel efficiency  of vehicle  engines  is likely  to continue,  although
overall  gasoline  demand  is expected  to grow as a result  of increased  economic
activity.
Competition at  the  bottom  of  the  barrel  will  influence the
consumption  outlook,  since the  demand for fuel oil will depend  on the  degree
of interfuel  substitution  in power generation  and industrial  installations,
especially  in developing  countries  where oil is the  swing  fuel.  If fuel  oil
prices rise appreciably above the  long-run marginal cost of  coal, coal
substitution  for fuel oil becomes  an economically  viable  option,  which,  under
certain  market  conditions,  can put downward  pressure  on oil prices. If fuel
oil prices  fall below this marginal  cost,  coal loses  its competitiveness  and
the  demand  for  oil increases.
Although the total share of petroleum  will continue  to decline in
LDCs,  the absolute level of demand for petroleum in  these countries is
expected  to grow at almost  2% a year, reaching  approximately  1.2  billion  tons
in the year  2000, up from about  750  million  tons in 1985. This represents  an
increase  of about 1  million  barrels  a day (1  MMBD)  for  the  non-OPEC  developing
countries  between  now  and 1990.- 40 -
Supply-Side  Effects
On  the  supply side,  the world  surplus of  oil  is  expected to
continue.  However, the larger developing  countries  which have hydrocarbon
potential are  unlikely  to  abandon  their  policies of  developing their
hydrocarbon  resources  in favor of imports in order to  replace and add to
reserves. Nevertheless,  it is likely  that these countries  will find it more
difficult to mobilize the financial resources from the international  oil
industry  or the financial  community.  Resources from the oii industry  are
unlikely  to be forthcoming  because  of the poor outlook for oil prices, and
borrowing  from the financial  community  may be precluded  by the  debt situation
in these  countries.
The broader  question  of financing  energy development  becomes even
more  complicated when  the  total  energy  sector  is  taken  into  account.
Countries  will need large sums of investment  to develop  enough  supplies  to
meet  even the  modest  growth  in demand  projected. These investments  can be  as
much as 4-5% of GDP and well over 25% of public  sector investment  in most
countries. The percentage  can be higher  for  countries  in which  energy  demand
is growing rapidly, large scale projects are being undertaken,  or  infra-
structure  is  needed  to  support  new energy  development.  1/
Most  of the investments  in oil  and  gas  will take  place  in the  middle
income oil-exporting  countries, and a  large proportion  of the investment
required  in both  oil importing  and exporting  developing  countries  will be for
internal  demand  rather  than  for foreign-exchange  generating  exports.
The uncertainty  of prices  over the foreseeable  future  will affect
decisions about which fuels to use and make access to external resources
increasingly  difficult. In this climate,  market  mechanisms  will come to play
a  more important  role, as it appears likely  that developing  countries  will
find  it  difficult to  continue  financing energy  development under  the
traditional  public-dominated  structure  of the  energy  sector. Changes  must be
made to provide  more flexibility  for short  term  adjustments  and  opportunities
for innovative  resource  mobilization.
1/  The  World Bank  has  estimated  that  approximately  $90  billion  a year (1982
prices)  would  be needed  in the  energy  sector  over the  next  decade,
including  some  $55  billion  in the  power  sector  and  about  $35  billion  for
exploration  and production  in the  oil and  gas industry. Most  of the
investment  in the  latter  involves  a heavy  proportion  of foreign  exchange,
which  could  amount  to  about $30  billion  a year  during  this  timeframe,  with
the  refinery  subsector  included. These  figures  should  be considered  very
rough  estimates  since  they  could  vary considerably  with changes  in the
projected  supply/demand  and pricing  scenarios. These  changes,  itl  turn,
could  influence  the  demand  for indigenous  supplies.- 41 -
Energy  Investment  Policy  Issues
Despite  these constraints,  a large proportion  of energy investment
will continue  to be publicly  financed  and  managed,  since  any major  adjustment
process such as this one requires time.  However,  an increasing  share of
future  investments  is likely  to be transferred  to other  forms  of ownership  and
operations.  To effectively  manage this process,  developing  countries  will
have to  decide:
what balance is desired between traditional  public ownership
and  other  forms  of ownership;
°  how  to  attract  investors  to finance  non-public  ownership;  and
o  how  to mobilize  domestic  and foreign  exchange  resources  for the
public  sector  program.
These discussions  will require that the developing  countries  have a  clear
strategy for  the volume, timing, and form of investments  required.  The
countries  will also need a clear set of policies  to implement  that strategy
and enough  flexibility  in planning  in order  to  consider  alternatives.
The formulation  of an overall  energy sector  strategy  has been made
more complex by the uncertainty  over future oil prices and relative fuel
costs.  These factors  have considerably  increased  the risks  associated  with
planning  in the power and industrial  sectors.  Nonetheless,  decision  makers
need to  design  strategies  that  position  the  country  to capitalize  on the lower
oil prices,  while  providing  the flexibility  to switch  to alternative  fuels  if
prices  increase  again.  For  countries  where  the sector  is  dominated  by large,
inflexible  public institutions,  considerable  adjustments  will be required  to
allow new marketing  structures  to emerge,  to improve  or privatize  key energy
institutions,  and  to initiate  new methods  of financing.
In  developing these  new  policies, energy pricing will  be  an
important  tool.  Countries  will need to shift  their  pricing  structures  from  a
centrally  planned  to a market-based  system,  particularly  if private  resources
are to be mobilized to finance investment  programs.  For example,  private
investment  in the  power  sector  could  occur  if the  electricity  were sold to the
grid at competitive  prices; likewise, investments  in refineries,  LPG, and
natural gas facilities  could prove attractive  if companies  were allowed to
market  the  gas  or petroleum  products  in  a domestically  competitive  market.
An important  part of developing  strategy  in many countries  will be
assessing their  overall energy  situation and,  more  particularly, their
resource  base and  potential  markets.
As mentioned before, developing  countries  must carefully  consider
whether they can  afford to  incur greater public sector debt burdens by
borrowing to continue  or accelerate  exploration  efforts.  Furthermore,  the
capital resources  from private  oil companies  will be scarcer  and spent more
selectively. In this  environment,  exploration  promotions  should  continue,  but- 42 -
be  well presented  and competitive. Similarly,  reconnaissance  work in  the  form
of geophysical  and geological  surveys  should  continue  to take  advantage  of the
prevailing  low  prices  for drilling  equipment  and services  and the willingness
of contractors  to enter  into  deals  for  prospective  surveys.
After  taking  stock  of their  resource  base,  countries  will need to  do
a thorough  assessment  of their  energy  markets.  Usir.g  revisc-d  forecasts  for
economic growth  prospects, a  sector-by-sector  demand outlook should  be
developed. This forecast  can  then be sensitized  to various  pricing  scenarios
to determine  the probable  extent  of interfuel  substitution. Not only should
the substitution  of coal for fuel oil be considered,  but also the possibil-
ities of developing  indigenous  gas supplies  to substitute  for other fuels.
This  demand  assessment  will allow  countries  to better  define  the  decisions  and
the  investments  required  in both  the  upstream  (exploration  and  production)  and
downstream  sectors.
A policy  on energy  pricing  is probably  the  keystone  to establishing
the framework  from which the energy sector  can operate.  Some oil importing
countries  may  maintain  artificially  high  domestic  energy  prices  as a means  for
the  government  to earn revenue  and reduce  their budget  deficits  and foreign
debts. Artificial  pricing  should  not, however,  be  allowed  to result  in energy
investment  decisions that are not economically  viable.  Furthermore,  while
lower  oil prices  will stimulate  the economy,  artificially  high energy prices
will  have  a  detrimental  effect  on  those  industries  that  compete
internationally  with companies  which  face  lower  energy  costs.
As part of their strategy,  countries  will have to weigh the impact
of lower oil prices on their past investments  and develop criteria  for new
ones.  For example,  countries  that have invested  heavily in domestic  energy
resources (geothermal,  gasohol, coal)  to displace imported oil, may  now
encounter  political  and socioeconomic  resistance  to abandoning  these invest-
ments.  To protect these industries  before  an upturn in world oil prices,
countries  may opt to impose  tariffs on the fuels  with which these projects
must compete.  It is doubtful  whether countries  should  adopt strategies  that
would artificially  insulate  new projects  from competitive  market prices  or
which  would  subsidize  the  projects.
Investment  decisions  for  new energy  projects  will depend,  to a large
extent,  on  whether  or not the  government  perceives  that  the  prevailing  low  oil
prices  are a temporary  phenomenon  and at what level  they believe crude oil
prices  will stabilize  in the long term.  In reappraising  projects,  decision
makers  will  certainly  need to  delay  some.
The perceived  direction  of the  government's  energy  pricing  policies
also will affect the success of attracting  capital for energy investments.
Except under special circumstances,  it usually is economically  prudent for
countries to gradually shift from government-fixed  prices to prices that
reflect  market  forces  and are flexible  enough  to adjust  to changes. In fact,
countries  that have adopted competitive  pricing policies in the past have
traditionally  experienced  sustainable  rates  of economic  growth.- 43 -
With a clear and realistic  set of pricing  policies,  countries  will
be in a better  position  to mobilize  domestic  and foreign  sources  of capital
for energy investments. To accomplish  this,  developing  countries  should be
flexible in  considering new  and  innovative approaches to  energy sector
structuring  and the financing  of energy projects.  Non-recourse  or limited
recourse  financing  should  be seriously  considered  so that  the financing  choice
is not  reflected in the country's credit or debt situation.  Petroleum
development  projects,  which involve  high capital  outlays  but also high rates
of return,  are good targets  for this type  of financing  because  the  cash flow
from the project can cover the debt service  and should  provide reasonabLe
profits.  There are two required  conditions  for limited  recourse  or project
financing. One is an acceptable  perception  of country  and project  risk.  The
other  is a strong,  internationally  recognized  partner.  An export  orientation
is preferable  so the project  can generate  foreign  exchange. These  conditions
may not prevail  for a large  number  of projects,  particularly  those  involving
import  substitutioti.  Nevertheless,  a special  effort  should  be made  to explore
this possibility,  if only because the benefits  of a thorough  risk analysis
would  establish  the  viability  of the  proposed  investment.
The  well-known practice of  leasing plants and  equipment can be
applied to the energy sector as a means of raising cash.  For example,  'a
utility  could sell  its existing  plant  to private  investors  to operate  and  buy
back  the  power  at rates  which  would  provide  an acceptable  and immediate  return
on their  investment. The  utility  could  use  the  funds  for  other  purposes  while
maintaining  use of the assets.  There  are also applications  of this leasing
principal in the  petroleum sector, i.e., leasing rather than purchasing
certain  oil field  equipment.
The custom  of issuing  tax-exempt  and  revenue  bonds is  widespread  in
the developed  countries  but could be more fully utilized  by power  companies
and certain petroleum  ventures  in developing  countries.  These  bonds can be
particularly  helpful in financing the local investment  costs of a  project
where foreign exchange is not  a  consideration.  Presenting investors a
practically  guaranteed  albeit low return  on their investment  and a cushion
against devaluation  due to local inflation  would attract local sources of
funds  and  might  stem the  exodus  of capital  from  the  country.
As part of their strategy,  developing  countries  should  enter into
joint  venture  arrangements  to lower  their  budgetary  requirements  and  allow  the
international  oil companies  to spread  out their  investment  capital.  Payback
arrangements  for both the private  and public  sector  partners  can  be flexible
so as to accommodate  them  both.
In addition to the measures  described  above,  developing  countries
must increase energy sector institutional  efficiencies  to attract private
capital. This generally  involves  the  privatizing  of state-owned  companies--a
practice  which is  especially  important  now  that  these  companies  have less of a
cushion from the large profits associated  with high energy prices.  The
problem of  inefficiencies  can be found in all  sectors,  and privatization
strategies  may  vary  from country to  country depending on  the  political
climate,  the level  of development,  and the overall  objectives  of the govern-
ment. Nonetheless,  privatization  is  most urgent  in the  energy  sector  since  it- 44 -
is larger  than most others,  requires  a higher proportion  of total  government
investment,  and has  a trickle  down effect  throughout  the  economy.
The process of privatizing  national oil companies  will require a
reevaluation  of general  macroeconomic  policies  as well as an examination  of
ways  to  restructure the  industry, introduce more  market forces, revise
regulations,  and improve  managerial  skills.  In addition,  legal and institu-
tional arrangements  should be revised in order to broaden the scope for
private sector involvement.  Privatization  could also involve identifying
investors,  selling  stock  on the  market,  and developing  principles  for  compen-
sating private investors (via dividends, etc.).  Increased efficiencies,
access to privately  held technologies,  and enhanced  opportunities  for growth
can compensate  for  any temporary  dislocation  (i.e.,  workers'  transfers,  etc.)
or loss  of economies  of scale.
Regardless  of a country's  ideological  views  on public  ownership,  the
long term  goal should  be a gradual  shift  to private  ownership  throughout  the
subsectors  of the energy industry.  Where it is not feasible  to introduce
market  forces  or attract  private  investment  in the sector,  efforts  should  be
made  to  maintain  and  strive  for  more  efficient and  cost  sensitive
operations.  These  new  financing techniques and  the  restructuring and
privatization  of the  energy  industries  have applications  in both the  upstream
(exploration  and  production)  and  downstream  activities.
Upstream  Investment
There are several  traditional  sources  of financing  for exploration
activities.  These include:  equity  from international  oil companies,  budget
expenditures  by national  governments,  and retained  earnings.  Over the past
decade,  there  has  been  growing  public  sector  financing  of projects  in  a number
of developing  countries  such  as India,  Brazil,  and Argentina. Over the past
few years,  with prices  declining  and industries  being  restructured,  terms  have
become  more liberal,  reflecting  this  more competitive  environment.
The  developing  countries, as  well  as  the  international oil
companies,  will continue to explore for oil, but the latter will be more
selective about  the  geology, contract terms, and  the  conditions (i.e.,
political climate) associated with  the  project.  To  react,  developing
countries  will have to introduce  more attractive terms, such as  reducing
government  take and introducing  more flexibility  in the contracts.  Thus,
contract renegotiation  to  reflect changing market conditions will become
common.  Therefore,  contracts  should  better  define  this framework  and look  ac
a  range of  options including:  (a)  seismic surveys; (b)  joint ventures;
(c)  risk  sharing farm-out; (d)  farm-in producing areas  and  exploration;
(e)  access  to domestic  downstream  markets  (particularly  for  natural  gas); and
(f)  longer  exploration  periods.
A number  of countries  with petroleum  capabilities  of their  own will
continue their exploration  programs  to replenish reserves  and discover new
plays.  Efficiency  becomes  more important  in an environment  of lower  prices- 45 -
and scarcer  capital  irn  order  to reduce  costs. Countries  should  also look  into
the possibilities  for  risk diversification,  including  the introduction  of new
buyers  (domestic  and foreign)  and investing  outside  their  own  territory.
For a  large number of producing countries  with high potential,
exploration  based on their "national  capability"  is a necessity,  since they
need to replenish  reserves  and assess their  potential  as an input to their
economic planning.  The  main problem is the structure  of this "national
capability." It does not necessarily  have to be 100%  publicly  owned;  rather,
a domestic  private sector  can be developed,  as in Argentina.  The potential
for this type of private industry  exists, for example,  in India,  Pakistan,
Brazil,  Colombia, and Peru.  This type of structure  also could  provide new
sources  of risk  capital.
Developing proven hydrocarbon  commercial  reserves is not partic-
ularly  difficult,  especially  if part of the production  can be exported. This
process  is expected  to continue;  however,  there  may be limitations  because  of
lower  economic  thresholds  which  may delay projects  and inadequate  terms  which
prevent  operators  from  mobilizing  financing. These  questions  are likely  to be
addressed  in case-by-case  negotiations. Contract  terms  and tax  regimes  intro-
duced  a few  years  ago  are  no longer  likely  to prove  attractive,  and a flexible
attitude  on the part of state  oil companies  will be required  to avert  a rash
of relinquishments,  particularly  in the  marginal  areas.
One main  issue is the development  of hydrocarbons  for domestic
markets (particularly  natural  gas) which would not generate  foreign  exchange
to cover  debt and operator  profits.  If a country  is  credit  worthy,  sovereign
risk borrowing is possible.  In many cases, borrowing capacity may be a
problem  and alternative  approaches  need to be considered,  such  as structuring
the  project on  the  basis of non-  or  limited-recourse  financing.  Most
important  is finding  ways to secure foreign  exchange,  for example,  through
swaps  in which payments  for gas  are made in petroleum  products  or crude  oil,
or through  the  export  of natural  gas liquids  or countertrade.  In fact,  equity
participation in  downstream facilities (particularly  for  gas)  should be
encouraged. Countries  also can  seek financial  guarantees  from commercial  or
multilateral  institutions.  They  can look  outside  the  energy  sector  to  enclave
projects  where  hydrocarbons  are  an input  to the  manufacturing  of an exportable
product,  such  as methanol,  urea/fertilizers  or power.
Developing  countries  are  considering  a number  of these  alternatives,
and a few deals  already  have been  concluded. The  main issues  are:  identify-
ing  investment  opportunities around  which  to  structure the  project;
reconciling  the interests  of the various  partners  through  an orderly  process
of negotiations based on  a  thorough risk analysis; and  finding adequate
arrangements  for  risk sharing.
Downstream  Investments
Renewed economic growth will mean  increased  energy consumption.
There  is still  an enormous  gap  between  the  LDCs  and the  developed  countries  in- 46 -
terms  of levels  of energy  consumption. During  the 1970s,  developing  countries
gave  priority  to  resource  development; now  downstream activities are
emphasized.  Tne goals are to obtain  a  ter fuel mix, eliminate  refinery
inefficiencies,  and realize  a higher  produrr  value,  for example,  through the
extraction  of LPG.  rhe  diversification  of supply  is a goal  of all  countries,
especially  as the OPEC proportion  is expected  to increase.  Countries also
seek capacity adjacent to their natural market, and they can invest in
refineries  in such regions.  They are also concerned  about optimizing  the
production  of  refined products domestically  in  order to minimize foreign
exchange  costs  (and  loss  of  value  added)  associated  with  imports.
Nonetheless,  for those countries  which have low demand  for fuel and little
potential  market  growth,  the  alternative  of importing  refined  products  may be
more  economic.
Most importantly,  developing  countries  are concerned  with  maintain-
ing  flexibility  during  a time of uncertain  oil prices  and shifts  in relative
fuel  costs.  Large  investments  are required  in the  downstream  areas  of refin-
ing, gas treatment  and transmission,  oil products,  LPG, ane gas distribu-
tion.  While the risk  of making  a mistake  is greater  in  this  environment,  the
costs  of making  a wrong  decision  are  also  higher.
The market  will require  considerable  work to identify  real  opportun-
ities;  therefore,  countries  will  need to move  from  an allocative  market system
to  a market-based  system. As noted  above,  this  requires  a competitive  pricing
system  based  on market  forces  and a thorough  market  assessment  and  the design
and implementation  of a marketing  strategy.
The developing  countries  are weak in these areas and will require
expertise in much of the work to be done.  The provision  of expertise is
essential in  order  for  developing countries to  implement their  energy
strategies  and attract  private  capital;  in this regard the  World Bank can be
of assistance.
The  World  Bank  Role
The World Bank has been active in the energy  sector  of developing
countries  for some  time.  Between  1975  and 1980,  the Bank  committed  more than
$10  billion for energy  development,  including  funds for electric  power, oil
and gas exploration  and development,  as well as infrastructure,  refineries,
pipelines,  etc.  The Bank has helped  countries  perform  assessments  of their
resource  and  supply and demand situations  and has helped them to promote
exploration  projects,  particularly  when no exploration  had previously  taken
place.  Together  these  projects  have enabled  developing  countries  to develop
their  resource data  base  and  begin  to  formulate comprehensive energy
strategies.
To stretch  out the energy funds it has available  for lending,  the
World Bank is promoting joint ventures; under these arrangements  the Bank
finances  the foreign  exchange  portion  of the  developing  country's  share  of the
project  costs.  The Bank's  funding for oil and gas projects,  which should- 47 -
reach roughly $700  million in 1987 and $1.2  billion in 1988, will have a
positive impact  on the capital  available  to the developing  countries,  when
coupled  with the  resources  that  can be  mobilized  from the  private  sector.
Almost  three-fourths  of the  funding  for  oil  and  gas  projects  will be
dedicated  to natural  gas projects.  Investors  are carefully  reviewing  their
technical  design and financial  returns  because of competition  from cheaper
fuel oil.  However,  the short-haul  projects  may still prove  economic  if the
gas can be used domestically  to free up oil for export} replace  dwindling
reserves,  or substitute  for fuel imports.  However,  few countries  have the
necessary  funds  or the institutions  and  technical  skills  to effectively  manage
this  resource. Under  these  circumstances,  countries  are calling  upon the  Bank
to play  a greater  role.  The Bank  firmly  believes  these  projects  should  play  a
key role  in the  countries'  overall  energy  strategies.
As another  way to encourage  the flow of investments  to developing
countries,  including  projects  in the  energy  sector,  the  World  Bank has  created
a new agency, the  Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Agency (MICA).  When it
becomes operational,  MIGA will provide,  for a  fee or premium,  guarantees
against  four  categories  of non-commercial  risks:
°  host government's  restrictions  on conversion  and transfer  of
foreign  exchange;
o  losses resulting from legislative  action or  administrative
action  by the  host  government;
o  the  repudiation  of a contract  by  the  host  government;  and
°  war  and  civil  disturbance  risk.
Conclusion
To prepare  for the  hardening  of oil prices  in the  future,  developing
countries  need to adopt robust  energy  investment  programs  to expand  domestic
energy supplies  and restructure  the sector,  where required.  Oil-exporting
developing  countries  must decide  how to  maintain  growth  in the  face  of falling
export  revenues  and  how to restructure  their  oil industries  to be better  able
to cope  with the  new,  market-oriented,  international  industry. Oil-importing
developing  countries  have to decide  who  should  be the  beneficiary  of the  lower
prices  and  plan their  fiscal  policies  and  energy  programs  to take  advantage  of
the opportunities  offered by the new pricing  outlook  while  minimizing  their
longer-term  risks.
Energy-related  investment  requirements  in developing  countries  will
remain  high, requiring  large  amounts of financial  resources  to be mobilized
under  conditions  of r.Jsource  scarcity  and high debt burdens  in the  developing
countries.  These countries  will have to adopt policies  that  attract  private
capital  in  an investment  climate  that is  nervous  about  the  impact  of uncertain
oil prices.- 48 -
Since  both major international  oil companies  and financial  markets
will greatly  restrict their  discretionary  outlays  and loans for exploration
and  developtcit,  even in countries  which  have  relatively  good prospects,  there
will be a trend  towards  more selective  exploration  programs.  III  short,  there
are more opporturities  worldwide  than there is capital  available  to develop
them.  LDCs that have exploration  and/or  development  potential  will have to
adjust  to the new investment  climate by increasing  their  knowledge  of their
resource base, making more attractive  areas available, modifying existing
contract arrangements, and  negotiating more  flexible contracts.  With
realistic  government  policies  and an open, flexible  attitude  toward private
sector  involvement,  exploration  and production  activities  should  continue.
Countries  should develop strategies  that call for initiatives  to
privatize  their  energy  sector  in  order to improve  efficiency,  attract  private
investors,  and  minimize government debt  burden.  They  should encourage
increased  competition  in the market place,  including  less direct  government
control,  and a decentralization  and divestiture  of services that could be
provided  by a competitive  private  sector. Companies  should  be allowed  access
to domestic  markets  for sales  of natural  gas and petroleum  products  in order
to encourage investment in both upstream activities and  refineries, LPC
plants,  and  pipelines.
Despite uncertainties  over the position  of relative  fuel costs in
the  future,  investment  decisions  in power  generation  and  heavy industry  cannot
be postponed  indefinitely. Instead,  they should  be influenced  by the  need to
have greater fuel switching capacity in order to maintain flexibility  to
respond to any future price fluctuations.  Likewise,  natural gas projects
which  can  displace  fuel  imports  or free  up oil for  export  should  go forward.
During this period of increasingly  difficult  access to financial
resources,  developing  countries  will need to implement  policies  that  call for
a thorough  reassessment  of their  supply  and  demand  situation,  strike  a better
balance  between  public  and private  sector  involvement,  and promote increased
efficiencies  and competitiveness  in the energy sector.  They will need to
adopt realistic  pricing strategies  and demonstrate  flexibility  in order to
mobilize  resources.- 49 -
Role  of  the  World  Bank  in  Gas  Development
Eugene  D.  McCarthy
The uncertainty  brought  about  by the  recent  sharp  4ecline  in oil
prices generates  risks for  future investors  and makes the  task for
policymakers  in developing  countries  particularly  complex. The risks  for
investors  go in  both  directions.  On the  one  hand,  there  is  the  risk  of  being
unduly  cautious  and  not  taking  advantage  of  the  prevailing  lower  oil  prices  to
prepare  for  a likely  return  of  higher  oil  prices  in  the  1990s. On  the  other
hand,  there  is the  risk  of being  too  adventurous,  overcommitting  to large,
capital-intensive  projects  that  may be vulnerable  to changes  in future  oil
prices. The  dilemma  is  how  to plan  and invest  in  such  a climate  of uncer-
tainty.  This paper  attempts  to highlight  some of the important  policy,
institutional,  and technology  transfer  objectives  that  should  be  pursued  in
developiag  energy  resources  during  this period  of uncertainty. Special
emphasis  is given to the development  of natural  gas resources  in the
developing  world  where  the  World  Bank  has  been  very  active.
Before  discussing  the  issues  involved  in  natural  gas  development  and
the  involvement  of the  World  Bank  in  certain  gas-related  investments,  it is
important  to understand  first,  the  World  Bank  and its  modus  operandi,  and
second,  the impact  of reduced  oil prices  for investment  in developing
countries.
The  World  Bank  Group
The  World Bank Group comprises  the  International  Bank  for
Reconstruction  and Development  (IBRD)  and its  affiliates,  the  International
Development  Association  (IDA) and the International  Finance  Corporation
(IFC).  The common  and  general  objective  of these  institutions  is to help
raise  the  standards  of  living  in  developing  countries  by  channeling  financial
resources  and policy/technical  advice from developed  countries  to  the
developing  world.
The  IBRD,  established  in  1945,  is  currently  owned  by  the  governments
of 149 countries.  The IBRD,  whose capital  is subscribed  by its member
countries,  finances  its  lending  operations  primarily  from  its  own  borrowings
in the  world  capital  markets. Part  of the  IBRD's  resources  also  comes  from
its  retained  earnings  and  the  flow  of repayments  on its  loans.  IBRD  loans
generally  have  a grace  period  of three  to  five  years  and  are  repayable  over
fifteen  to twenty  years.  They  are directed  toward  developing  countries  at
Note: The  initial  draft  of  this  paper  was  presented  at  the  Asia-Pacific  Gas
Technology  Conference  held  in  Kuala  Lumpur,  Malaysia,  in  September
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more advanced  stages  of economic  and social  growth.  The interest  rate the
IBRD charges  on its  loans  is  calculated  in accordance  with a guideline  related
to its cost of borrowing,  and it is held close to the LIBOR rate charged by
comnercial  banks.  The  current  rate for  the  first  half of 1986 is 8.5%.
IDA was established  in 1960 to provide assistance for the same
purposes  as the !BRD,  but primarily  in the  poorer  developing  countries  and on
terms that would bear less heavily on their balance  of payments than IBRD
loans.  IDA's assistance, therefore, is  concentrated on  the  very  poor
countries--those  with  an annual  per capita  gross  national  product  of less than
$790 (in 1983 dollars),  although  90% of the IDA  money  goes to countries  with
less than $400 per capita.  More than fifty  countries  are currently  eligible
under  this  criterion.
Country eligibility for  IDA  assistance  is  determined  by  the
following  three  criteria:
poverty  (as  measured  by per  capita  income);
a  limited  creditworthiness for  borrowing  from  conventional
sources;  and
°  economic  performance, which  includes an  ability  to  make
effective  use of resources  and the availability  of suitable,
economically-viable  projects.
The IFC was established  in 1956.  Its function is to assist the
economic  development  of less-developed  countries  by promoting  growth in the
private  sector  of their  economies  and  helping  to  mobilize  domestic  and foreign
capital  for  this  purpose.
The assistance,  both financial  and non-financial,  given to LDCs by
these three  institutions  is designed  to directly  affect  the  well-being  of the
masses of poor people  in developing  countries  by making them  more productive
and  by integrating  them  as active  partners  in the  development  process.  In the
last five years, the Bank as a whole has stepped  up its lending  for energy
development, which  includes  exploration and  development  of  petroleum
resources.  Although  lending for power forms the largeat  part of the Bank's
energy program  commitments,  oil and gas development  have shown the greatest
increase.
It is important  to  note that  the  transfer  of resources  to developing
countries  is  only  one--albeit the  most  visible--aspect  of  the  Bank's
developmental  role.  its  role  as a partner  in the  dialogue  with  governments  on
overall  economic  policy  and sectoral  strategies,  and as a source  of technical
assistance and  advice, is as  important as  its  role as a  lender.  The
deteriorating  economic climate in  many of  the  Bank's member  developing
countries  has increased  the importance,  as well as the visibility,  of this
advisory  function.- 51 -
Oil  Price  Impact
The precipitous  decline  in international  crude  oil prices  in recent
months is an important  development  comparable  in reverse to the two upward
price  shocks  of 1973  and 1979. The  effects  of these  developments  are still  in
process.  How one views  them  depends  very  much on where one stands.  The oil
price collapse  has had an impact  in three  major areas:  (a) on the world
economy;  (b)  on the petroleum  industry  itself;  and (c)  on energy  policies  in
the  developing  countries.
In viewing  the effects  on the world  economy,  a distinction  must be
made between  direct and secondary  effects,  and between immediate  and longer
term results.  OECD countries  have been major beneficiaries  of the income
transfer  (due  to reduced  oil import  costs),  with Japan,  West Germany,  France,
and Italy receiving  about 40% of the total.  Many developing  countries  will
also  benefit  from  such  direct  import  savings--Turkey,  Thailand,  Korea,  Brazil,
and  India  being  principal  cases. Countries  in this  group  might  expect  to save
between  10%  and  20% (or  more)  of their  total  import  bill.
In contrast, serious  export revenue  losses  are being felt by the
North Sea countries, the  Soviet Union, and a number of other developing
countries  of  which,  in East  Asia,  Indonesia  and  China  are notable. There  are,
however,  secondary  effects  of the price decline  which  benefit  all countries,
importers  and exporters  alike.  These include:  the non-oil trade linkages;
the  impact  on inflation  and interest  rates,  and  hence  on debt service;  and the
possible  improvements  in the terms  of trade  for many countries  as OECD import
demand  expands  and the  U.S. dollar  depreciates. All  these  factors  benefit  the
growth  prospects  in a wide  range  of countries.
jiae  collapse of  oil prices has special implications  for energy
policy  in developing  countries. The policy  implications  are immediate  and in
some cases--particularly  in the exporting  countries--serious. It is clear
that  governments  in both importing  and exporting  countries  face important  and
urgent  decisions  on how to respond  to cheaper  petroleum. The need to act is
most  pressing  in the exporting  countries  where  the revenue  loss,  coupled  with
a resulting loss of borrowing  power, can be accommodated  only by sizeable
reductions  in expenditure.  In the oil importing  countries, the issues  of
distributing  benefits  do not make the policy  choices  any easier,  more obvious
or less political  in content.  Continued  expansion  of the energy sector  is
still  not cheap.  If a decade  of lower  oil prices  provides  a major boost to
world  economic  growth,  the supply  of energy  resources  in time will need to  be
expanded.  Thus, the energy  sector  will continue  to absorb a large share  of
the investment  programs of  the developing  countries (between 15% and 35%
commonly;  in some cases  above 50%) and energy  pricing,  sound  management,  and
due attention  to efficiency  will be no less  important  than in the past.  One
particular  challenge will be finding debt minimizing  ways to finance the
expansion. Improving  the efficiency  with which capital  is used is a critical
issue  for  developing  countries.- 52 -
Regional  Energy  Policy  Issues
Before  discussing  the World Bank's  specific  involvement  in natural
gas, some general observations  on the energy  issues  of the Asian  Region are
appropriate.  The  East Asia  and  Pacific Region  comprises a  number  of
developing  countries  with quite different  energy problems  without a  common
theme.  In the oil-importing  countries  such  as Thailand,  the Philippines,  and
Korea,  there  will  be a need  to  maintain  policies  which encourage  efficient  use
of energy,  as well as attract  scarce  private  risk  capital  to continue  explo-
ration.  Equally,  there  will be a need to:  (a)  carefully  review  investment
options in a  climate of uncertain oil  prices; (b)  examine the scope for
restructuring their  large  national oil  companies  in  the  sector;  and
(c)  support  the  mobilization  of domestic  resources  at a time when government
revenues  are declining.  For a second  group  of countries  which export  oil--
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and China--there  will be a short-term  need to maintain,
as far as possible,  export  revenue,  while in the longer term reduce their
potential  vulnerability  to a single  energy  choice.  Investment  strategies  in
these countries should promote energy diversification,  particularly into
natural  gas, LPG, and, where feasible,  domestic  coal.  Natural gas merits
special  attention.  The awareness  of natural  gas as an important  source df
energy  is relatively  recent  in this group of countries;  but, at this moment
many of these countries  (Korea,  Indonesia,  and Malaysia)  are on the verge of
developing  domestic  gas industries.
The realization  of the importance  of natural gas  in a country's
energy  balance  has gone further in Asian developing  countries  than in other
LDCs and has provided  an important  stimulus  for the economic  development  of
several of  these  countries endowed with  commercially exploitable gas
reserves.  In Pakistan, it already meets 40% of  total commercial  energy
needs.  In  India and  Bangladesh,  major projects are under way  for  the
continued development of  gas  fields  and  the  building of  downstream
infrastructure  for domestic  use; Thailand  has  already successfully  completed
the  first  phase  of its  natural  gas development,  and there  is clearly  potential
for further  development. In China, there is an increasing  awareness  of the
importance  of natural  gas in its  energy  balance,  heightened  by the  realization
that  a major part of its offshore  hydrocarbon  potential  may not, in fact, be
oil  but  natural  gas.  Indonesia  is the largest  exporter  of LNG,  and  Malaysia,
as  mentioned before, is already exporting LNG  and  is now  preparing to
undertake  major gas investments  for domestic  use.  Even in Burma,  greater
attention  is now being given to natural  gas reserves  and the potential for
increased  domestic use.  Finally, both Korea and  Singapore are preparing
themselves  for  introducing  imported  natural  gas,  both as a fuel  and  feedstock,
into  their  economies.
Natural  Gas
Natural gas  reserves exist  in  about  50  developing countries,
including  at  least 30 that presently  import  oil.  In these countries,  gas
reserves  were found in the process  of exploring  for oil, but they have not- 53 -
been fully  developed  or evaluated  because  of the lack  of immediate  incentives
to  inivest  in their  development.  In a large  number  of developing  countries,
the utilization  of natural gas could greatly reduce  the dependence  on oil
imports or allow larger oil exports.  However, before natural gas can be
developed,  there are a number  of institutional,  contractual,  financial,  and
technical  issues  which  have to  be resolved. It is  for  these  reasons  that  many
countries  have  delayed  the  development  of natural  gas resources. With this in
mind, about 10 years  ago the  World Bank  began  to assist  its  member  countries
in the development  of natural  gas resources,  not only by providing  financing
for specific  projects,  but by providing  a comprehensive  program in planning
natural  gas development  from the exploration  phase  to the  market place.  In
particular,  the World Bank assisted countries in evaluating  domestic and
international  markets for natural gas and in addressing  key policy issues,
including  gas pricing,  in order  to maximize  the use of the resource  for the
benefit of the countries  involved.  Since each country  is unique, before  a
comprehensive  program for developing  natural gas can be established,  the
particular  situation  within the country,  such as the availability  of other
energy resources,  pricing,  marketing,  the existing infrastructure,  must be
studied  in order  to draw  up an appropriate  gas development  strategy.
The fundamental  requirements  that  are common  to all the developing
countries  are:  (a)  that the natural gas be relatively  low cost; (b)  that
there  exist,  or can  be  developed,  a market  that can  compete  with other  sources
of energy; and  (c)  that there is a capability  and opportunity  within the
country to develop the necessary infrastructure. Gas development  is often
treated in the same way  as oil development,  despite clear differences  at
various  phases  of implementation.  As a result,  gas  has  been  flared  and/or  has
remained  undeveloped  despite  marketing  opportunities.
Investment  Implications  of Oil Price  Decline
The recent  decline in oil prices  has investment  implications  both
for  energy  investments  overall  and for  natural  gas  in particular.
Changes  in  oil prices  clearly  affect  the  future  consumption  patterns
of all commercial  and non-commercial  energy  sources.  In countries  with less
regulated  energy  markets,  the  recent  fall  in oil  prices  has been  partially  or
completely  passed on to consumers.  This has, in some instances,  already
increased  the  demand  for  oil  products. In the  many  developing  countries  where
fuel prices  and supplies  are  more heavily  regulated,  there  has been more of a
Lag.  Although  flexibility  in fuel switching  may be limited  in the short  run,
over the longer  run, if oil prices  remain  below  alternative  fuel prices,  oil
consumption  will certainly  increase.
One result  of greater  oil price  uncertainty  is that larger energy
consumers will consider investing in more flexible equipment in order to
increase  fuel switching  capacity in the event of any future  price fluctua-
tions.  This has already begun to happen  in many developed  countries.  The
same  process  of fuel  diversification  and  investment  in fuel  switching  capacity
is expected to proceed in many of the middle-income  developing countries.- 54 -
Some of the poorer developing  countries,  however,  cannot afford the higher
capital  cost of investments  that allow for greater fuel flexibility  (e.g.,
dual fired power plants).  As a  result, they may remain relatively more
vulnerable  to sudden  fluctuations  in fuel  prices.
Natural  gas investments  most likely  to be  affected  by lower  fuel  oil
prices are those involving longer  distance pipelines  and liquefied natural
gas, because  of the very high up-front  fixed  costs.  Natural  gas development
for  domestic  use in countries  with lower cost supplies  and relatively  short
distances to  the  market should, in  many  instances, remain economically
attractive. Also,  where  gas pipeline  networks  have already  been constructed,
as in Bangladesh,  Pakistan,  Yugoslavia,  and Argentina,  the incremental  cost  of
additional  gas production  will likely  be lower,  or at least  no greater,  than
fuel oil costs.  Where  gas resources  have been discovered  but not developed,
as in Papua  New Guinea,  the choice  between  gas and fuel oil is likely to be
more difficult,  and will depend,  to a large  extent,  on the potential  size of
the  domestic  market  and  on the  relative  cost  of alternative  fuels.
World  Bank Involvement  in  Natural  Gas
World Bank lending  activities  for  naturai  gas have been extensive,
particularly  in Asian  developing  countries,  where they  continue  to expand.  A
few  of these  natural  gas  projects  are presented  below.
Pakistan
The  World  Bank  has  had  a  long-standing involvement in  the
development  of  natural gas  in Pakistan, starting from  the  early  1960s.
Several lending operations  have been made to support  gas transmission  and
distribution  systems  from  the  main source  of gas supply,  the Sui field.  Most
recently,  in 1982,  a $43  million  loan from the  World  Bank  helped  to finance  a
$196.8  million project as  part of the  Government's  plan  to  increase gas
production  by 30 million  cubic feet per day.  The project was designed to
further  expand  the Sui  Northern  pipeline  system,  the largest  in the country,
to transmit  and distribute  an additional  70 million  cubic feet of gas daily.
Project  components  included  the installation  of a gas purification  plant to
treat additional  raw gas, construction  of about 430 miles of high pressure
transmission  pipeline,  and installation  of 5 turbine  compressor  units in 4
existing  compressor  stations. In  addition,  the  project  will provide  a service
line  for some  25,000  new  connections  to the system  each  year between  1984  and
1986.
The Government  of  Pakistan had been setting  consumer gas prices
below  the true  economic  value of this  resource  in order  to foster  greater  use
of gas.  These prices  have stimulated  demand  but they  have also discouraged
gas  exploration  and development. As a result,  progressively  severe  shortages
have arisen since 1978 which curtailed economic growth by  impeding power
generation  and industrial  production. As a result  of these  policies,  the  oil
companies  have been slow to develop existing  small  fields  and potential  new
reserves,  which has resulted  in an overall shortage  of gas.  Over a dozen- 55  -
prominent  structures  in gas prone areas still  remain to be tested  and some
discoveries  have yet to be evaluated.  Bank involvement  has helped  bring to
the Government's  attention the basic need for a new gas producer pricing
formula  if natural  gas is to be developed.  The Government  recently  enacted
such a pricing  formula  which, it is hoped,  will increase  the willingness  of
private  companies  to develop  new fields.  Presently,  new  entrants  as well as
existing concessionaries  are discussing gas prices with the Government of
Pakistan.  In 1985,  the  World Bank approved  a loan of $55 million  to support
the  further expansion and appraisal of  oil and natural gas  reserves in
Pakistan involving the Government of Pakistan and  two successful private
companies.
Thailand
The World Bank has been involved in natural gas  development in
Thailand  since 1979.  In that year, the World  Bank provided  a $4.9  million
loan to help finance  the initial  engineering  phase for  developing  Thailand's
natural  gas potential,  which  comprised  preparatory  work for constructing  the
gas pipeline  by 1981.  This  was followed  in 1980  by a $107  million  loan  which
was designed  to support  a project  to construct  a pipeline  system  to transport
gas from  the Union  Oil offshore  and  to distribute  it to industrial  consumers--
chiefly power generating stations.  In addition,  the technical assistance
component  provided  training  of the  Petroleum  Authority  of  Thailand  (PTT)  staff
in administration,  operation  and maintenance  of the natural  gas pipeline  and
distribution  system,  and  advisory  services  in  finance  and  technical  assistance
for the refinery  expansion study and an energy conservation  study.  As a
follow-up  to the  gas pipeline  project,  the World  Bank in 1982 financed  a gas
complex  by providing  a $90  million loan  to PTT.  This  plant  is fed  by natural
gas from the previously  financed  natural gas pipeline.  Furthermore,  since
that time,  the Bank  has concinued  a dialogue  with the Government  of Thailand,
PTT, and Shell.  Very recently,  the Bank also helped  finance  PTT's share in
the  exploration  and  development  of the  Sirikit  oil  field. Of equal importance
to its financing  role has been the collaborative  non-financial  role the Bank
has played in supporting  the formulation  of a  long-term  energy investment
plan.  This effort  culminated  in the  symposium  held at Pattaya  at the end of
last  year.  This support  continues  during  the  implementation  of this  plan.
India
In  India, the  Bank  participated financially in  four  offshore
petroleum  projects. Two  of these  loans  were for  the  development  of the  Bombay
High oil field located  off the west coast of India.  A third Bank loan of
US$165.5 million was made to India in 1982 for offshore petroleum oper-
ations.  This loan is being  used to finance  exploration/appraisal  activities
in selected  areas of  the offshore and onshore Krishna Godavari Basin.  A
fourth  Bank loan  made to India,  also for  an offshore  petroleum  project,  was to
develop  the field  and included  the construction  and installation  of process
and well platforms,  drilling  of production  wells, undersea  gas pipeline to
Hazira  in Gujarat,  and gas treating  facilities  onshore. The project  is being
implemented  and is scheduled  for completion  in 1987.  This development  marked
the first significant  supply  of gas for the fertilizer  industry  and power
markets and  is a major step towards developing  a domestic  gas industry in- 56  -
India.  A second  phase  development  is currently  under  preparation  to provide
gas supplies  for the  major 1,800  km onshore  gas pipeline,  the  construction  of
which  will  start  in  the  near future.
Bangladesh
At the request  of the  Government  of Bangladesh,  the  Bank affiliate,
IDA,  recently  approved  a $70  million  loan  to finance  part  of the  cost of a gas
development  project.  The main purpose  of the loan was to rationalize  gas
development  and provide  adequate  supplies  to the Dhaka area over the  medium
term.  (An earlier  project investment  of approximately  $110 million in 1981
helped  to  finance a  major  gas  development and  transmission system  to
Chittagong  form Bakhrabad  gas field.)  The recently  approved  project  has two
main components:  a gas field appraisal  and development  program,  and a gas
infrastructure  component. The development  component  involves  the Kailashtila
and Beani Bazar gas fields located  in the northeastern  part of the country.
These  fields  yield  gas  relatively  rich  in condensate  which  adds to the  attrac-
tion  of the field  development. The gas infrastructure  component  includes  the
design  and  installation  of surface  facilities  at Kailashtila,  Beani  Bazar,  and
Rashidpur  and a 117-mile  pipeline  from  Kailashtila  to the  main gas grid.  One
of the major components  of Bank technical  assistance  to Bangladesh  was to
focus on establishing  an equitable  and rational  natural gas pricing policy.
In the past, low prices for natural gas have been partly responsible  for
encouraging  rapid  growth  in demand  and the inefficient  use of gas.  The level
and structure  of gas prices have been determined  largely by administrative
regulations. Prices  therefore  did not reflect  the economic  cost of different
consumer  groups and were not designed  to allocate  natural gas efficiently.
Until World Bank involvement,  there had been no attempt  to study gas prices
systematically.  As a  result of  Bank involvement in  this  project, the
Government  of  Bangladesh recognized  the importance of  instituting  a  more
rational  gas pricing  system  and  has begun  to act to promote  the  efficient  use
of natural gas while recognizing  economic,  financial,  political,  and social
constraints.  Pricing studies for the  use of gas by various industries  are
currently  being  conducted  in Bangladesh  based on the ideas  and suggestions  of
the  World  Bank.
China
The World Bank has become  more involved  in the Chinese petroleum
sector  over the last  five years,  most recently  in the Sichuan  Province,  where
it helped  finance  a technical  assistance  project to assess the potential  for
recovering  additional  gas reserves  from the Weiyuan  gas field.  Natural  gas
will play  a growing  role in China's  energy  balance  over the  next two  decades;
its importance  has been heightened  by the large  natural  gas  discovery in the
South China Sea which followed the first round of exploration  activities.
Developing  the full benefits of the country's  natural gas potential, both
onshore and offshore, is critically  important  for China's economic growth.
The  World  Bank  has  initiated  discussions  and  seminars  with  Chinese  authorities
on the importance  of natural gas to the country; on the need to develop
capable  institutions dedicated  to  the  transmission, distribution, and
marketing  of this energy  resource;  and on the need for coordination  with the
eventual  users  of the  gas, particularly  in the fertilizer,  industry,  and powersectors,  as well as in town ges  use.  These  conversations,  both in regard  to
onshore  and  offshore  gas  prospects, are  continuing with  the  Chinese
authorities.
The foregoing  provides  some examples  of the Bank's involvement  in
natural  gas development  in Asia.  The Bank also has worked in Africa, Latin
America,  the Middle East, and North Africa.  In fiscal  year 1985, the Bank
committed  about  $850 million  to finance  oil  and gas projects  in 14 developing
countries. Of this  amount,  over  half ($525  million)  was used directly  for  gas
development.
Ccnclusion
In the  future,  developing  countries  will need to continue  investing
in the  energy  sector  and in the  gas  subsector  particularly  because  natural  gas
has  the potential  to satisfy  diverse  energy  needs and  alleviate  the  burden  of
oil  imports. Each investment  will have to be carefully  scrutinized,  however,
in the context  of current  and future  oil price  movements,  the supply  cost of
alternative  fuels,  and the scope  for  attracting  private  entrepreneurs  to help
provide  some of the needed investment. As has been the case so far, World
Bank financing  will continue to play a catalytic role in attracting  other
investors  and  lenders  to participate  in high  priority,  economically  sound,  and
financially  attractive projects in the natural gas subsector.  Developing
natural  gas  potential  will be a major  step  forward  for  developing  countries  in
diversifying  future  energy  supplies,  reducing  their  vulnerability  to  oil price
increases,  and  enhancing  economic  growth  prospects.PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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